Expansion of Russia

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THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA:

PROBLEMS OF THE EAST AND PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST.

BY
ALFRED RAMBAUD.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

Books upon Russia, her people and history are attracting their share of attention. That great, mysterious, distant empire, with a continuous history of conquests since the day when the Mongol yoke was thrown off, with an heroic age whose traditions are as attractive as any of Western Europe; an absolute despotism, rooted in the despotism of its former Asiatic conquerors, superseding the more primitive but freer communities, having the one aim since the time of Peter the Great, to find an outlet on an unfrozen sea. Baffled in Southeastern Europe, Russia has pressed at the points of least resistance until now she is about to emerge on the Persian Gulf, as she has already on the shores of Manchuria.

Great Britain and Russia, "the elephant and the whale," the great rivals in Asia, so different in their origins, their constitutions, their power of assimilation, are now face to face.

M. Alfred Rambaud, the author of a history of Russia which was at once recognized by Russian and British students of Russian history as most authoritative and the best of all accessible histories, is a Senator of France and has held important government positions. He is the translator of Seeley's "Expansion of

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England" and has written many important works, relating to his own country and Russia. He is a member of the Institute and his "History of Russia" was crowned by the French Academy in 1883.

The present little volume is a reprint of an essay written for THE INTERNATIONAL MONTHLY and first printed in the September and October issues of that journal. It meets the demand for a condensed yet authoritative history of that Russia known to the world. The onward course of Russia is forcibly told in these pages. The great demand for the magazine numbers has induced the publishers to issue the essay separately, with a table of contents and divided into chapters with topical headings, knowing that as a brief presentation of Russia's development, her aims, and probabilities of success, there is no other book accessible to the American public which surpasses it.

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The Expansion of Russia

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA.

THE ORIGIN OF THE RUSSIAN STATE AND NATION — THE TARTAR-MONGOLS — PRINCIPALITY OF MOSCOW — THE UNITY OF RUSSIA — ISOLATION — THE AIM OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY.

E fail to discover, however far back we go towards the beginnings of the Russian State, any indication that this was ever destined to become a maritime power. In the ninth century, the Slavic tribes that were to form the first political organization designated by the name Russian,—the Slavo-Russian tribes,—occupied a territory securely shut in on the west, by the Poles and the Lithuanians; on the north, by the Finnish tribes, the Livonians, the Tchudis, and the Ingrians; on the east, Finnish tribes again, the Vesi, the Merians, the Muromians, and two Turkish tribes, the Meshtcheraks and the Khazars, that occupied all the northern coast of the Black Sea; allowing but a single one of the Slavo-Russian peoples to hold a position upon its shores. Except at this point,

these Slavo-Russian tribes nowhere had access to the coast. The shores of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean were Finnish; those of the Baltic, Finnish or Scandinavian; those of the Black Sea were held by the Khazars, the Caucasian tribes, the Byzantine Empire, and the Bulgarians, a Finnish tribe that had imposed its name and sovereignty upon a certain number of Slavic tribes.

In the East and North, the Slavs were not to be found even in those regions where afterwards rose the Russian capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Beyond began those immense spaces that stretch away into the depths of Central Asia, and even to the Pacific Ocean, spaces peopled with Finnish and Turkish tribes, and other branches of the Uralo-Altaic family. Then, still further east, were to be found certain peoples of the yellow race.

To speak now only of the Russia of Europe, how did the Slavo-Russians, who in the ninth century held scarcely a fifth part of their present territory, succeed in securing possession of it all? A two-fold change came about during the centuries. On the one hand, the Slavo-Russians, very venturesome in disposition, following, at first, the course of the rivers and their tributaries, spread out over the vast plains that stretch away to the Ural Mountains; founding everywhere cities, villages, and markets right in the midst of the territory of the aboriginal tribes. On the other hand, they absorbed the greater

part of those tribes, and imposed upon them their language, religion, and even their manners and customs. A double colonization, therefore, took place, a colonization of the soil and a colonization of the native. The ancient Uralo-Altaic tribes, subjugated or absorbed by the Russians, have disappeared from the map of the empire. There persist still only some scattered remnants of them, surrounded by men of Russian race and speech, and destined soon to disappear. These aborigines are to be found in fairly compact groups only in those places where the severity of the climate, the barren character of the soil, the thickness of the forest, and the desert steppes check Russian civilization, an ethnographical medley, moreover, occupying only a very small and indifferently valuable part of the European Russia of to-day.[1]

Thus the primitive tribes of the Slavo-Russians formed an agglomeration which was everywhere well-nigh entirely shut off from any sea. This had a character essentially continental; the population was wholly agricultural in character, and, except as fleets of light boats descended the Dnieper in the tenth century to harass Constantinople and to commit piracy on the Byzantine shores of the Black Sea, there was nothing to indicate that it would one day come forth as a maritime power.

(1) Thus the Suomi, the Karelians, and the Laplanders in Finland; the Zyrians and the Permians, in the northeast; the Tcheremisa, the Mordva, the Votiaki, the Meshtcheraks, and the Bashkirs on the river Volga, or between the Volga and the Ural Mountains and river.

The Russia of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was scarcely European. She was bound to Europe only by her form of religion, and even that, borrowed from Byzantium, was an Oriental, an almost Asiatic form of Christianity. When there came about in the eleventh century the rupture between the Latin and Catholic Church of the West, and the Greek and Orthodox Church of the East, a still higher barrier was raised between the two parts of Europe. To the Western Christians, the Greeks and the peoples that they had evangelized, the Bulgarians, the Servians, the Moldavo-Wallachians, and the Russians, were only schismatics. Now, while the Catholic peoples of the West, thanks to more favorable historical circumstances, began to take shape as powerful nations in which an already well-advanced civilization went on developing, the schismatic peoples of Eastern Europe, assailed by successive invasions from Asia, and after having long served as a living bulwark against barbarism for ungrateful Europe, were checked in their historic evolution, and fell one after the other into servitude to pagan Mongols or Mohammedan Turks.

The country where the Slavo-Russians first established themselves was only a prolongation of the great plains which, scarcely broken by the Ural Mountains, extend to Behring's Sea, Okhotsk Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Geographically, topographically, this primitive Russia was already Asiatic. Just as the winds from Asia swept unhindered all this immense plain, so could the migration

of peoples and invading expeditions, at times originating near the Great Wall of China, pour unchecked over the Russian plains as far as the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula.

One of those revolutions, so frequent among the nomadic tribes of Asia, brought together from 1154 to 1227 under the blue banner of Temuchin, called Jenghis Khan, numerous tribes of shepherds and mounted nomads. They adopted as their collective name that of the Tartar-Mongols. At their head "the Inflexible Emperor," "the Son of Heaven," conquered Manchuria, the kingdom of Tangut, North China, Turkestan, and Great Bokhara, and founded an empire which extended from the Pacific to the Ural Mountains. Under the successors of Jenghis Khan, these mounted hordes, maddened by the fury of war and conquest, crossed into Europe, fell upon Russia, then divided into numerous principalities, carried the capital cities by assault, annihilated, one after the other, the armies of foot and horse sent against them, and in 1240 converted all Russia into a mere province of the Mongol Empire. The Russian princes and the chieftains of the Finnish tribes became vassals of the Great Khan,[1] who held his court on the banks of the Onon, an affluent of the Amur, or at

(1) Consult Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, London, 1876. Wolff, *Geschichte der Mongolen*, Breslau, 1872. Léon Cahun, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie*, Paris, 1896.

Karakorum on the Orkhon, a stream emptying into Lake Baikal. They were also more directly the vassals of one of his vassals, the Khan of the Golden Horde, who was stationed at Sarai on the lower Volga.

At this period the Tartar-Mongols, among whom Mohammedanism was disseminated until about 1272, were still Buddhists, Shamanists, or fetich worshipers; at heart very indifferent in matters of religion, and strangers to any thought of propagandism or of intolerance. They, therefore, left the Russians in undisturbed possession of their religion, their laws, and their own princely dynasties. They merely exacted tribute, and, in certain contingencies, military service; and every new Russian prince must go to receive his investiture either at Sarai, or even by a journey that would occupy years, at the court of the Great Khan. There they were compelled to prostrate themselves at the foot of his throne, to defend themselves against the accusations of enemies, or of their Russian rivals; and the Khan disposed of their heads as of their crowns. Many Russian princes were executed before his eyes. Some among these, the Russian Church honors as martyrs.

Among the Russian princes who went there to prostrate themselves before the Horde were those who had founded round about a little market-town, the name of which is met with for the first time in 1147, a new principality, that of Moscow, one of the most insignificant of the Russian states of that period. It was estab-

lished in the midst of a Finnish country, among the Muromians. It formed, therefore, a colony of primitive Russia. The princes of Moscow knew how to turn to their own advantage the Mongol yoke that weighed on all Russia. They were more adroit than the others in flattering the common master and the agents that represented him in Russia. One of them, George (1303–1325), even married a Tartar princess. In their struggles against other Russian princes, they always carried the controversy to the court of the Khan, who almost always decided in their favor, and sent them away with the heads of their rivals. They secured from the Khan the privilege of collecting the tribute, not only from their own subjects, but from the other princes of Russia. This function as tribute collector for the Khan raised them above all their equals; and the more humble vassals of the barbarians they showed themselves to be, the better did they establish their suzerainty over the other Christian states. They succeeded thus in building up a powerful state, which was called the "Great Principality" of Moscow. When they felt themselves to be strong enough, and perceived that the Mongol Empire had grown sufficiently weak through internal dissension and divisions to warrant the attempt, they turned against the barbarians the power that they owed to them. In 1380, the Grand Prince Dmitri, having refused payment of tribute, defeated Mamaï, the Khan of the Golden Horde, at Kulikovo on the Don. But the

Mongols were not yet as weak as Dmitri Donskoï (hero of the Don) had thought. Tamerlane, or Timur-Leng, had just conquered Turkestan, Persia, Asia Minor, and North Hindustan. One of his lieutenants, Tokhtamysh, having vainly summoned the Grand Prince Dmitri to appear before him, marched against Moscow, captured the city and its Kremlin, sacked the other cities of the principality, and everywhere reëstablished Asiatic supremacy. Nevertheless, the Mongol yoke was not to survive long the heroic effort made at Kulikovo. The great barbarian empires founded by Asiatic conquerors quickly fall to pieces. This historical law was verified in the Empire of Tamerlane, as in that of Jenghis Khan. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Mongol Empire of Asia was divided into the Mongol Empire of China, the Mongol Empire of India, the Mongol Kingdom of Persia, and a large number of khanates in Turkestan and Siberia; and all those states were scarcely any longer Mongol save in name. In Russia itself, the Golden Horde was broken up. From its debris were formed the czarate of Kazan on the middle Volga, the khanate, or czarate, of Sarai, or Astrakhan, on the lower Volga, the horde of the Nogaïs, and the khanate of the Crimea. In 1476, Akhmed, the Khan of Sarai, sent a demand for tribute to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great. Ivan put the ambassadors to death. Four years later, the Khan Akhmed marched upon Moscow with a large army. Near the rivers Oka and Ugra

he met the army of Ivan the Great; but neither of the adversaries dared force the passage of the two rivers. They remained there several days exchanging insults and darts from the opposite shores. Then a panic simultaneously arose in both armies; the one fleeing in the direction of Moscow, the other in the direction of Sarai. It was in this bloodless, inglorious way that the Mongol power in Russia came to an end.

The Mongol yoke had continued two hundred and fifty-six years (1224–1480). It left in Russia traces that were for a long time ineffaceable. Before the Tartar conquest, the power of a Russian prince was founded upon European origins. It recalled the patriarchal authority of the old-time chieftains of the Slavo-Russian tribes; the martial authority of the heads of the Scandinavian or Variagian clans, like Rurik and other Variagian chiefs, called into Russia, it is said, by the Slavs; and the authority, at once civil and religious, of the Byzantine-Roman emperors, whom the successors of Rurik, like all the barbarian chieftains of Eastern Europe, liked to take as models. After the Tartar conquest, on the contrary, the Russian princes, and especially the Grand Princes of Moscow, selected as prototypes of their own authority the Khans and Great Khans with their autocratic power,—coarse, irresponsible, Asiatic. From that time forward, they treated their vassals as they themselves had been treated by the Khans. Between the Grand Prince and his vassals, and between these and the peas-

ants, the relations were those of brutal masters and tembling slaves. The sovereign of Moscow did not differ from a Mongol Khan, from a Persian Shah, or from an Osmanli Sultan, save as he professed the orthodox religion. He was a sort of a Christian Grand Turk. When the title of Grand Prince seemed to him unworthy of his increased power, the title that his ambition chose was none of those that the Christian rulers of the West then bore; it was the one which the Khans of Siberia, of Kazan, or of Astrakhan had arrogated; it was the title of Czar, which, of course, has not any etymological connection with that of Cæsar, a fiction invented very much later. Such was the title that the heir of the Grand Princes of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible, solemnly took in 1547. Many other facts attest the predominance of Asiatic influences over the Russia of the sixteenth century. The costumes of the Czar of Moscow and of the other great lords, the princes and boyars, were Asiatic; Asiatic was the servile etiquette of the court; touching with the brow the foot of the throne, and the humble formulas in which the highest personages declared themselves to be slaves; Asiatic was the seclusion of the women in the *terem*, which was a Russian harem;[1] Asiatic was the equipment of the royal cavalry with their high

(1) However, it is proper to call attention to the fact that the servile character of the court etiquette may also have been borrowed from Byzantium, and that the Russian *terem* may have had its original in the gynæcium of the Greeks.

saddles and short stirrups; their boots with the toe in the form of an upturned crescent; their armor reminding one of the Chinese and Japanese; their curved swords, their bows and quivers, and their head-dress, which resembled a turban surmounted by an aigrette. All this Oriental apparel was to continue in vogue until the time when Peter the Great, with the violent measures of an Asiatic despot, forcibly introduced into Russia the short clothing of the West,—"German dress," that is, European. With this change in costume, he also brought in the fashion of shaving the face; the holding of social gatherings, which the recluses of the *terem* were compelled to attend; the etiquette of the Christian courts; the formulary of the German bureaucracy, and the uniforms, equipments, and tactics of the armies of the West.

While Russia was still groaning under the Mongol yoke, the Grand Princes of Moscow, utilizing their servitude as an instrument of power, caused the other princes to bow before the terror of the Mongol, and brought about "the consolidation of the Russian territory," that is to say, they founded the unity of Russia. When the family line of the Grand Princes and Czars of Moscow died out in 1598, and when there began for Russia "those troublous times (*smoutnôïé Vrémia*)," which the accession of the Romanofs brought to an end in 1613, the czarate of Moscow was already a very powerful state.

In the North especially, by the annexation of the territories of the ancient republics of Novgorod and Pskof, the Muscovite supremacy was extended to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. On the west, in a series of wars against the Lithuanians and the Poles to "recover" from them Russian territory which they had formerly conquered, the Moscow czarate had carried its power beyond Pskof and Lake Peïpus, and had reached the Dnieper at Kiev and Smolensk. In the South, it had reached neither the Black Sea nor the Sea of Azov, from which it was separated by the Ukraine that still belonged to the Poles, by a republic of adventurers and pirates called the Zaporovians, by the khanate of the Crimean Tartars, by the camping grounds of the Nogaian Tartars, and, finally, by the maritime power of the Ottomans on the Euxine. Eastward, Russian conquest and colonization had made great advances. The uniting of the old territories of Novgorod, and the annexation of those of the republic of Viatka, brought the Muscovite domination to the Ural Mountains. The conquest of the czarate of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, in 1552, gave him all the region of the middle Volga, and the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan, two years later, placed in his power all the lower Volga country, with a part of the coast of the Caspian Sea. Finally, the conquest of the khanate of Sibir, between the years 1579-1584, by the Cossack Irmak, carried the Russian eagles beyond the Urals, and opened before them the immensities of Siberia.

But the more extensive the Muscovite Empire became, the more it suffered from not having access to any sea which was all the year free from ice, or which would afford an outlet to the ocean. The harbors of the White Sea were closed with ice eight months of the year; the Caspian Sea is only a great lake without an outlet. To reach the Baltic Sea, it would be necessary to battle against the Germans, the Poles, and the Swedes, the masters of all its shores. To gain access to the Black Sea, there were, again, the Poles to be fought, as well as the Tartars, the Zaporovians, and the Grand Turk. Now, the European neighbors of Russia were beginning to fear this great barbarian empire. They were convinced that it would become truly a terror to them the day on which, by obtaining regular communication with the West, it could thereby learn something of their civilization, their industries, and, above all, their military art. They understood that the backward condition of its civilization was the only safeguard against its ambitions. They, therefore, closed against it their eastern frontiers, and barred it out of the Baltic. At the time when Ivan the Terrible, profiting by the decadence into which the Sword-Bearers, the religious military order of the Livonians, had fallen, took their lands away from them, and raised his flag at their port of Narva, Poles, Germans, and Swedes united against him; they incited fresh invasions of the Crimean Tartars, conspiracies and rebellion among his nobility; and, after a bitter struggle of twenty-four years,

compelled him to abandon his conquest in 1582. So long as Narva was in the hands of the Czar, Sigismund, King of Poland, did not have a moment's peace. When English merchants began to resort there, he wrote threatening letters to Queen Elizabeth, summoning her to forbid that traffic. "Our fleet will seize all those who continue to sail thither; your merchants will be in danger of losing their liberty, their wives and children, and their lives." And this confession escaped him: "We see by this new traffic the Muscovite, who is not only our enemy to-day, but the hereditary enemy of all free nations, furnishing himself thoroughly, not only with our guns and munitions of war, but, above all, with skilled workmen, who continue to prepare equipments of war for him, such as have been hitherto unknown to his barbaric people. * * * It would seem that we have thus far conquered him because he is ignorant of the art of war and the *finesse* of diplomacy. Now, if this commerce continues, what will there soon be left for him to learn?"

Thus, it was not merely unpropitious nature that kept Russia in a condition of blockade; but the jealousy of her neighbors mounted a most rigorous guard around these "barbarians" of the North. The empire of Moscow remained condemned, like the agglomeration of Slavic tribes of the ninth and tenth centuries from which it had sprung, to a purely continental life. It was shut up to its vast northern plains like the Swiss to his mountains, and seemed to have as little chance of ever becoming a maritime power.

Hitherto, the Muscovite Empire with its military organization wholly Asiatic, with its noble-born knights and free peasants, with its infantry militia, the *streltsy*, with its old-fashioned artillery, with its irregular troops of Cossacks, Tartars, and Calmucks, had been able to withstand victoriously Asiatic forces; but it could not maintain a struggle against the regular troops and improved weapons of the western nations. In order to make her mark in Europe, it was necessary for Russia to become European; but she could not become European if Europe persisted in holding her in a condition of blockade. It was a "vicious circle"; and it was reserved for the genius of Peter the Great to succeed in breaking that circle.

Henceforth, we see Russian diplomacy, with tireless patience, with a shrewdness equal to its persistency, endeavoring simultaneously in all directions to pierce the blockade. She strives to secure access to the Baltic Sea; and we shall have the Northern War of Peter the Great, the partition of Poland under Catherine II., the Finland question under the Czarina Elizabeth, and under Alexander I. She strives to secure access to the Black Sea; and we shall have the Eastern Question in all its forms, from the first efforts of Peter the Great down to the war of 1877-78. of Alexander II. She strives to make herself mistress of the Caspian Sea, and the attempt made by Peter the Great will reach an end only under Alexander III. She strives to secure access to the Indian

Ocean, and we shall have the wars and treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, and England. She strives to secure access to the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean, and we shall witness the work of Siberian colonization and all the phases of the Far Eastern Question. The matter of securing new territory concerns her much less. It has been the supreme end of her efforts, at times continued for centuries, to reach a sea, —a sea free from ice, a sea opening into the ocean.

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE.

PETER THE GREAT—POLAND—THE EASTERN QUESTION—LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES—CATHERINE THE GREAT—TURKISH WARS—GREEK INDEPENDENCE—CRIMEAN WAR—THE BALKAN STATES—NIHILISM—RESULTS OF EUROPEAN WARS—NICHOLAS II.

E know with what energy and alternation of success and failure Peter the Great struggled against the Swedish masters of the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic. We are amazed when we reflect that a war, lasting more than twenty-one years; a war that convulsed all Europe; that brought the Swedes into the heart of Russia and the Russians into the centre of Germany; that brought about the creation of a Russian army and navy under the fire of the enemy, and that numbered a score of battles on land and sea,—should have ended in results apparently so meagre as were those gained by Russia in 1721 at the Treaty of Nystad; namely, the acquisition of four small provinces, Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Karelia. But these prov-

inces gave him on the Baltic the ports of Riga, Revel, and Narva; they gave him also the mouths of two rivers, the broad Neva and the Düna, or Dvina (not to be confounded with the other Dvina that empties into the White Sea). It was on the islets of the Neva that Peter the Great had founded in 1703, on lands still disputed by the Swedes and by the floods, the capital of European Russia, St. Petersburg, protected on the west by the maritime fortress of Kronstadt. Yes, "the Giant Czar" considered himself amply repaid for his efforts of twenty-one years by the fact that for his vast continental empire, still wrapped in Asiatic darkness, he had been able "to open one window on Europe."

This window was still a very narrow one. It was somewhat enlarged by Elizabeth, when, after a war foolishly undertaken by Sweden, she made that country, in the Treaty of Abo, 1743, surrender some districts in Finland. Later, Alexander I., during his short-lived alliance with Napoleon, conquered from his recent ally, Gustavus III., all of Finland (Treaty of Fredericksham, 1809). Russia had now no longer anything to seek in that direction.

Westward, between Russia, already powerful and always war-like, and Prussia, now grown great in glory and strength, lay an extremely weak state made up of the kingdom of Poland, the grand duchy of Lithuania and some old-time Russian districts. The first three partitions of this state (1772, 1793, 1795), carried the

Russian frontier to the Niemen, the Warthe, and the Dniester. Catherine II. completed these conquests by the annexation of Courland, which had been a vassal dependency of the fallen kingdom. It is to be noted, however, that in what is called "the partition of Poland," Catherine II. did not acquire any Polish, but merely Lithuanian territory that formerly had been Russian. If Napoleon I. had not attempted to reëstablish on the Russian frontier a Polish kingdom under the name of "the grand duchy of Warsaw," perhaps Russia would not have been ambitious to secure possession of any former Polish territory. After the fall of Napoleon, the Czar Alexander I. was obliged to appropriate a considerable part of this under the name of "the kingdom of Poland," were it for no other reason than to prevent an increase of territory upon the part of the two German powers. Henceforth the western frontier of Russia was fixed. It has not changed since 1815, and, to admit the possibility of a change in the future, it would be necessary to admit the possibility of a total overturning of the European balance of power.

Though Russian expansion towards the north was stopped by the icy solitudes of Lapland, westward by the frontiers of states as firmly established as the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, yet for a long time a broad way remained open to Russia in the direction of the south. The decadence of the Ottoman Empire seemed to offer her the same favorable opportunities as

did the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire. In this direction, acquisition of territory promised to be infinitely more precious. The Russians could dream of the Black Sea, the Propontis, and the Ægean Sea becoming Russian lakes; of Christian peoples of the same religion (Roumanians and Greeks),—and of some of the same religion and race (Bulgarians, Servians, Croatians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Montenegrians),—welcoming the armies of a Liberator Czar, and joyfully accepting the domination of Russia in exchange for that of the Ottoman; and, finally, they could dream of Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, freed from the yoke of the infidel, and of the cross taking the place of the crescent on the dome of Saint Sophia. Nevertheless, it was, perhaps, in the direction of the south that Russia, in her schemes for expansion, after some brilliant successes, found herself the most completely deceived.

For a long time the sovereigns that sat upon Russia's throne at Moscow, and then at St. Petersburg, were infatuated with this Oriental mirage. The Russian Orthodox Church urged them on in this course through sympathy with the Orthodox Christians who were in subjection to the infidel. Even the Roman Catholic Church at a certain time encouraged them in the hope that the sword of the Czar might accomplish both the deliverance of the Christians and *the union of the two churches*, that is to say, the subordination of the Greek

Church to the Roman. It was Pope Paul III., who, at the advice of the Greek cardinal, Bessarion, offered to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great, the hand of his ward, Sophia Palæologus, the niece of the last Christian emperor of Constantinople. It was at Rome that the marriage took place, and it was the Pope who gave a dowry to the heiress of the Cæsars of the East.[1] It is from the time of this marriage that the double-headed eagle of the Palæologus took its place on the escutcheons and standards of the Russian sovereigns. Paul III. was deceived in both his hopes; for the union of the two churches was never accepted at Moscow, and many years passed before a Russian army was able to advance a step southward. The second of the Romanofs, Alexis, father of Peter the Great, set the first landmark southward in the Treaty of Andrussovo with Poland, in 1667, by acquiring a part of the Ukraine, extending as far as the upper course of the Dnieper. Vast spaces still separated the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. Nevertheless, in the coolest and shrewdest minds brooded the idea of a holy war against the infidel. Peter the Great, still young and journeying in Western Europe, learning its arts and himself wielding the carpenter's axe at Saardam, wrote, in 1697, to Adrian, the Patriarch of Moscow: "We are laboring in order thoroughly to conquer the art of the sea, so that

(1) Le R. P. Prerling, *La Russie et l'orient—mariage d'un tsar au Vatican*, Paris, 1891; *La Russie et le saint-siége*, 2 vols. Paris, 1896–'97.

having completely learned it, on our return to Russia, we may be victorious over the enemies of Christ, and by His grace be the liberator of the down-trodden Christians. This is what I shall never cease to desire until my latest breath."

Upon his return to Russia, however, his struggle with Sweden occupied all his attention. It was only in 1711, when his enemy, Charles XII., a refugee in the domains of the Grand Turk, earnestly sought to have the latter take up arms against Russia, that Peter the Great allowed himself to be tempted by the appeal which the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia, Montenegrian envoys, and Greek agents addressed to him in the name of Christians who were oppressed and ready to rise in revolt. He found immense spaces to be traversed; and crossed the Pruth with only thirty-eight thousand starving and harassed soldiers. He discovered that all the promises of the Levantines were unwarranted; he met neither allies nor help; and beset by two hundred thousand Turks, or Tartars, he had to consider himself fortunate to get back again across the rivers, after having signed the Treaty of Falksen, or of the Pruth, which restored to the Ottomans his first conquest, the city of Azov.

The second southward step of the Russians was the conquest of a bit of territory that was peopled with Servian colonists, and that was called New Servia. This acquisition was won by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739; but it had cost the Empress Anna Ivanovna three years

of war and useless victories, and nearly one hundred thousand men.

The third was a gigantic step. After the first war against the Turks, Catherine II. found herself checked by the intervention of Prussia and Austria, who compelled her to renounce nearly all her eastern conquests, and to accept a compensation in Poland. Nevertheless, by the Treaty of Kaïrnaji, in 1774, she had ceded to her Azov on the Don, and Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper. She forced the Sultan to recognize the independence of the Tartars of the Bug, of the Crimea, and of the Kuban. This was to prepare for their annexation to Russia, which was successfully accomplished and sanctioned by the Constantinople Compact of 1784. All the north shore of the Black Sea and of the Dniester, as far as the Kuban River, now became Russian. The last Mohammedan states of Russia were converted into provinces of the empire, and the last vestige of "the Tartar yoke" was effaced from Russian soil.

At once in the Tauric peninsula and at the mouths of the rivers arose formidable fortresses, Kherson, Kinburn, and, on a bay of the Crimea, Sevastopol was made ready to control the Black Sea. An entire Russian fleet was built up, which could in two days cast anchor before the walls of the Seraglio. The conquest of the Turkish Empire, impossible to Peter the Great, seemed to become easy for Catherine the Great. In the triumphant journey that she next accomplished through the conquered pro-

vinces, her route was crowded with triumphal arches, bearing this inscription: "The way to Byzantium." She herself provoked the second Turkish war (1787-1792). The Russian armies, everywhere victorious, advanced to the Danube. The janissaries and spahis of the Sultan could not stop them in their course. But again did European diplomacy intervene. Catherine II. had to give up the Roumanian *hospodarates*, which had been entirely subdued, and be satisfied with Otchakov, and a strip of territory between the Bug and the Dniester, and with guarantees more explicit than those of 1774 in favor of the Roumanian principalities. This arrangement, accomplished at the Treaty of Yassy, 1792, established over these principalities a sort of distant Russian protectorate. Thus, although four Russian interventions had already occurred, not an inch of Christian territory had been wrested from the Sultan, and not a Christian tribe had been delivered from his yoke.

The fifth intervention took place under Alexander I. So long as his alliance, made at Tilsit in 1807 with Napoleon continued, his armies were victorious. The Roumanians were again conquered as far as the Danube; Bulgaria, conquered as far as the Balkans; and under George the Black (Kara-Georges), Servia won her independence with her own forces alone. The rupture with Napoleon compelled the Czar to sign the peace of Bucharest with the Sultan in 1812. Of all his conquests, he retained only a bit of Roumanian territory, Bessarabia

between the Dniester and the Pruth—as also Ismail and Kilia on the lower Danube. The Roumanians and Bulgarians fell again under the Ottoman yoke, and Servia was abandoned to herself. Nevertheless, an amnesty was stipulated in favor of the Servians, and guarantees were given in favor of the Roumanians. In 1827, Nicholas I., by the Akerman Agreement, which was an explanation of the Treaty of Bucharest, caused the guarantees accorded the Roumanians to be clearly defined. As for the Servians, crushed for a time by Ottoman retaliation, they had taken up arms under Milosh Obrénovitch, and, thanks to European intervention, they obtained, with certain restrictions, their autonomy.

The sixth intervention of Russia occurred on the occasion of the Greek revolution. On July 8, 1827, Russia, France, and England entered into concerted action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the three powers annihilated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino (October 20). While a French army was operating in the Morea to insure Greek independence, Nicholas I. took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Eastern Question. His European army again conquered the Roumanians and Bulgarians, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople. In Asia, his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. The Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, guaranteed the autonomy of Moldavia, of Wallachia, and of Servia, and consummated the independence of Greece, which was formed into a kingdom. Thus were

the hopes that Peter the Great had entertained respecting the Christians of the East partially realized; but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe except the isles of the Danubian delta; reserving for herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open way through the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Only in Asia did she secure a territorial indemnity.

The second eastern war, undertaken by Nicholas I., and which began like the others by the conquest of the Roumanians, brought about the intervention of France and England in the Crimea, which caused the Czar Nicholas to die of grief, and which ended in the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856). By this treaty, his successor, Alexander II., had to renounce all the advantages gained in Europe by the Treaty of Adrianople; to give back the delta of the Danube; to consent to the limiting of his military power in the Black Sea; and to abdicate his exclusive right of protection over the Danubian principalities, which were henceforth placed under the collective protectorate of the great powers.

When France found herself engaged in a bloody duel with the German Empire, Russia profited by the occasion to have a conference called at London in March, 1871, by which she secured the suppression of article two of the Treaty of Paris, which limited her military power in the Black Sea.

The last and the most decisive Russian intervention was the one provoked in 1877 by the Bulgarian massacres,

the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolution, and the uprising in Servia and in Montenegro. In addition to the help of these different forces, Russia made sure of the armed assistance of the principality of Roumania, that had been formed in 1859 by the union of the two old-time *hospodarates* of Moldavia and Wallachia. She again made the conquest of Bulgaria and of a part of Thrace. This time, it was in plain sight of Constantinople that the victorious armies of Alexander II. halted. The Sultan had with which to oppose them only twelve thousand men, encamped on the heights of Tchadalcha. It seemed, therefore, to be in the power of the Czar to bring to an end the Ottoman domination in Europe, to proclaim the liberation of all the Christian peoples, and at last to plant the cross on the dome of Saint Sophia. But before the threatening demonstration of England and the disquieting attitude of Austria and Germany, he did not dare to do so. He contented himself with imposing upon the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which secured for the *protégés* of Russia an actual dismemberment of European Turkey. Montenegro saw its territory doubled in extent; Servia and Roumania were declared entirely independent. The first received the districts of Nisch, Leskovatz, Mitrowitz, and Novi-bazar; the second acquired Dobrudscha, but on the condition that it return to Russia the delta of the Danube, which Wallachia had acquired in the treaty of 1856. Bulgaria was to form a vassal principality of Turkey.

Her territory extended from the Danube to the Black and Ægean Seas, leaving around Constantinople and Salonica only some fragments of Ottoman territory. In Asia, Russia acquired the fortresses and districts of Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid. Moreover, Turkey was to pay a war indemnity of three hundred and ten million rubles.

Thus Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself in Europe. It was sufficient for her that Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria were completely liberated and organized. Of course, she hoped that these petty states that owed their very existence to her would be more docile to her influence than to that of the Sultan; less accessible to the hostile influences of the German and English powers; that their ports would be open to her, and that their armies would constitute auxiliary corps of the Russian army.

An early disillusion came to the "Liberator Czar." The relative disinterestedness of which he had given proof at San Stefano did not foresee the jealousy of Austria, fostered as this was by Germany and England. Under threat of a general war, they demanded a revision of that treaty. England would have even desired that the treaty of 1856 should be taken as a basis for discussion, as if she could proceed with the victorious Russia of 1878 as she had done with the Russia of 1856, conquered in the Crimea. The Czar agreed to the calling of a congress in Berlin. The treaty that was signed

there July 13, 1878, curtailed Montenegro of half the part assigned her, and forbade her having a navy; took back Novibazar and Mitrowitz from Servia, and was particularly harsh towards Bulgaria; reducing her territory by one third, and carving the remainder into two provinces: Northern Bulgaria, with the title of "vassal principality," and Southern Bulgaria, under the name of the province of Eastern Roumelia, which continued under Turkish domination, but which was to be administered by a Christian government. Increase of territory was granted to Greece by the addition of a district of Epirus (Arta) and almost all of Thessaly. There was even quibbling over the territory that Russia had retained in Asia. Bayazid was taken from her, and Batum was to be dismantled and to become an open port. What especially irritated the Czar was the fact that the two powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his victories found means to slice off a share for themselves. Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, by a separate treaty, England had given to her by the Sultan the island of Cyprus (30th of May and 4th of June) and a controlling situation in Anatolia.[1]

Emperor Alexander II. had run the danger of a European war in order to carry out his programme of "liberation." The danger still remained imminent, so

(1) A. d'Avril, *Négociations rélatives au traité de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi.* Paris, 1886.

long as he did not accept the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. There threatened to spring up again, at each of the manifold incidents that arose over the task of settling the boundaries of the ceded countries, armed protests, now by Greece, and now by the Albanians, against certain decisions of the powers that were not to their fancy, and intrigues by Austria and England for the purpose of alienating from Russia the sympathies of the nations emancipated by her victories. In addition to this, the Panslavic agitation, which had been sufficiently strong in Russia to lead the government to run those risks in the East, did not subside. The most impetuous minds found cause of grievance against the Czar, that he had not carried out his undertaking to the end, and had his victorious regiments enter Stamboul, at the peril of a conflict with the English in the very streets of that capital. The Liberals made a pretext of the constitutions granted the Roumanians, the Servians, and the Bulgarians, to demand a constitution for Russia. The Panslavist and Liberal agitation had, perhaps, some connection with the rise of another agitation which soon made its appearance, an agitation called Nihilism, of a character entirely revolutionary and subversive, and which fitly terminated on that tragic day of March 13, 1881, when the "Liberator Czar" became the "Martyr Czar."

For his successor, Alexander III., the results of the eastern war were preparing another series of disillusions. The only fruit that Russia could still expect from her

sacrifices and her victories was the strengthening of her influence over the Christian peoples emancipated by her, —and their eternal gratitude. Now immediately after this war the most short-sighted Russian statesmen were constrained to confess that the success of their arms had just created on that "Way to Byzantium" which Catherine II. had so thickly strewn with premature triumphal arches, obstacles more insurmountable than those which the armies of the Sultan had ever been able to oppose to the armies of Alexander I. or of Nicholas I.,—more insurmountable than the Danube or the Balkans, formerly bristling with the fortresses of the Ottomans. These new obstacles consisted in the existence itself of the emancipated nations, and their attachment to their newly found freedom. Thus it was that France, after she had emancipated Belgium under Louis-Philippe and Italy under Napoleon III., found that she had raised upon her northern and southeastern frontiers barriers far more impregnable than the armies or the fortresses of Austria; that she had closed forever against herself those Belgian and Lombard battlefields over which her ensigns of victory had so often floated. In the formation of an Italian kingdom, France created the chief obstacle in the way of her own expansion on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The French have naturally and repeatedly denounced the ingratitude of Italy; nor can the Russians be blamed for their grief over the ingratitude of the Roumanians,

the Servians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. But such is human nature! The feeling of independence and of national pride among newly born peoples will always outweigh the feeling of gratitude towards their liberators. In this respect there was no difference between the peoples joined to the Russians merely by religion, like the Roumanians and the Greeks, and those who were related to them both by religion and race, like the Bulgarians and the Servians. In former times, when the Ottoman yoke rested upon them with its frightful burden, assuredly they would all have joyfully accepted the lordship of the Czar in exchange for that of the Sultan; but now, when it was a question of choosing between the domination of the Czar and their own independence, there could be no hesitation with any of them.

The Russians had done much for the Roumanians. Even when they had been unsuccessful in wresting their territory from Turkey, they had in the treaties of Kaïrnaji, Yassy, Bucharest, Akerman, and Adrianople, stipulated precious guarantees for their *protégés* and then, later, secured for them an almost complete autonomy. In concert with France, in 1861, they had made the Sultan accept the union of Moldavia and Wallachia into one province. In 1878, they assured this principality of Roumania its full independence, and, in 1881, they consented to its being organized into a kingdom. But the new King of Roumania, Charles of Hohenzollern, and his new subjects meant to remain independent of

every other power, to have their own army and navy, their own national policy and diplomacy, and to exercise the right, whenever their liberators showed themselves in the slightest degree meddlesome, to seek help even from Russia's rivals, Austria, Germany, and England, or, even more than this, from their old-time oppressor, the Sultan of Constantinople. More than once, the Roumanians raised complaint against Russia, because, in 1812, she had annexed the little Roumanian district of Bessarabia, and because, in 1878, she compelled them to give back to her the islands of the Danubian delta.

It was the same with the principality of Servia, also made into a kingdom in 1882, and which, according to the needs of its national or dynastic policy, did not cease to oscillate between Russian and Austro-German influences. It was the same also with the kingdom of Greece, which paid no heed to the remonstrances of Russia, when her national ambition was involved, and which had no scruples in troubling the peace of the East every time that it was possible for her to raise the question of uniting to the Hellenic state either Epirus or Northern Thessaly or Macedonia or Crete.

The country that was under the greatest obligation to Russia was Bulgaria. If France or England had at times assisted in the liberation of the Roumanians, the Servians, and the Greeks, it was to Russia *alone* that the Bulgarians were indebted for this deliverance. Immediately after the "Bulgarian atrocities" of 1875, Russia had hastened

to her help. From the condition of simple *raïas* oppressed by Turkey and cruelly treated by the Tcherkesses and the Bashi-Bazouks, she had caused them to be instantly raised to the dignity of a free people. At San Stefano, she had endeavored to unite them into one state, the most powerful of the Balkan peninsula; which would have extended from the Danube to the Black and Ægean Seas; and she accepted only with deepest reluctance the mutilation and dismemberment that the Treaty of Berlin imposed upon "Great Bulgaria." She gave the restricted principality of Bulgaria at least a constitution when she herself had none. It was the Russian commissioner in Bulgaria, Prince Dondukof-Korsakof, who, on February 23, 1879, convoked at Tirnovo the first "constituency assembly"; it was he who presided at the meeting of the first "legislative assembly," or *Sobranié*; it was he who espoused the cause of their prince, Alexander of Battenberg; it was he who organized a Bulgarian army of one hundred thousand men supplied with valiant Russian officers, well equipped, well drilled, and provided with excellent artillery. Nevertheless, this people and this prince, who owed everything to Russia, began at once to practice a policy in which the advice of the Czar Alexander III. was no longer heeded. They set out to remove the Russians who had portfolios in their ministry and positions in their army. In spite of the Czar, they brought about the revolution of Philippopolis in September, 1885, which ended in the union of the Bulgarian princi-

pality and the Bulgarian province of East Roumelia, but which provoked a bloody war with Servia, jealous at seeing her neighbor's increase of territory. When Alexander of Battenberg had to renounce his throne in 1887, it was a prince that posed as a client of Austria and of Germany, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, whom the Bulgarians called to rule them. With his Prime Minister, Stambulof, he governed,—resolutely set against the influence of Russia; he discriminated against her partisans, and surrounded himself with her adversaries. And, thus, the liberation and the organization of Bulgaria, which the Czar had hoped to be able to direct, have gone on independently of him, and, in certain respects, in opposition to him. *Sic vos, non vobis!* Alexander III.'s resentment against Bulgaria and her prince was very bitter. The somewhat imperious and meddlesome affection of the early days soon turned into hostility. When Alexander III. died, in 1894, the rupture was complete between the intractable principality and the powerful empire.

Thus all the wars undertaken in Eastern Europe by Russia, from Peter the Great in 1711, down to Alexander II. in 1877, have ended, except in Asia and on the north coast of the Black Sea, so far as territorial expansion is concerned, in most meagre results. Seven great wars have brought her only a strip of Roumanian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Roumanian bit of land in the delta of the Danube.

Even this last morsel, acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1877 only at the cost of vehement faultfinding upon the part of the Roumanian people. Russia, whose fleets have twice—at Tchesme in 1770, and at Navarino, in 1827,—annihilated the naval power of Turkey, have never been able to secure even an island in the Ægean Sea.

Thus much for material advantages. As to satisfaction of a moral character, the Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stamboul, nor to pray in Saint Sophia; and as to gratitude upon the part of the liberated peoples, we have seen what Alexander II. and Alexander III. could never have dreamed of.

Their successor, the present Emperor, Nicholas II., seems to have taken it for granted that in the direction of the Danube, of the Black Sea, and of the Ægean Sea the destiny of Russia is fixed for a long time to come. In these directions, she has no longer any moral or material advantages to gain, and the age of sentimental undertakings is also at an end. Unless there should come some European overturning, the famous "Eastern Question" will have for Russia only an archæological interest. All that Nicholas II. is doing seems to indicate that this is his conviction. He shows no interest in the party struggles and ministerial crises in the Roumanian and Servian kingdoms; towards the Bulgarians, he shows neither jealous affection not the irreconcilable rancor of his father. Whenever the Prince and people of Bulgaria

have manifested a desire for reconciliation with Russia, he has cordially welcomed them; he sent a representative to the orthodox baptism of the Crown Prince Boris, but apparently without forming any illusions as to what he might expect of his *protégés*. When the Cretan insurrection occurred, and the war foolishly undertaken by the Greeks against Turkey was declared, he was careful not to assume a leading *rôle*, something that his three predecessors would not have failed to do. On the contrary, he seemed to sink Russia in the "European Concert," to associate her in all the decisions of the five other great powers, and purely and simply to accept accomplished facts. Also, when the Armenian troubles and massacres took place, he did not attempt to intervene, nor to arrogate to himself, either by land or sea, the *rôle* of liberator of this other oppressed people. He has rather favored a temporizing policy, and has discouraged the plans formed by the other powers to send European fleets to the very walls of the Seraglio, and to impose by force reforms upon the Sultan Abdul-Hamid. On the other hand, in certain other directions, in that of the Indian Ocean, in that of British India, and in that of the China and Japan Seas, Russia has followed a very formal, a very decided policy. At once very energetic and skillful in this policy, she has, at the same time, acted in entire independence of the "European Concert."

Russia in Asia

THE SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.

An Asiatic Power—Wars and Treaties with Persia—A Way to the Indian Ocean—In the Caucasus—Paramount in Persia.

IF the policy of the present Emperor of the Russias seems to be inspired by other principles than those of his predecessors; if this policy has shown itself to be essentially peaceable and disinterested in Europe; if it has shifted its sphere of activity from the West in order to devote all its efforts to Southern and especially to Eastern Asia,—this is perhaps due to the impressions made upon the Czar during his extended travels in the years 1890 and 1891, while he was still only the Czarovitch Nicholas. He visited Greece, Egypt, British India, French Indo-China, Japan, and China. Then, disembarking at Vladivostock, a powerful Russian naval station on a bay of the Sea of Japan, he returned overland to St. Petersburg, crossing the whole extent of Siberia. The Czarovitch, of course, did not give his impressions a literary form; but one of

his travelling companions, Prince Oukhtomski, has published his in two luxurious volumes, magnificently illustrated by the Russian artist Karazine.[1]

The opinions of Prince Oukhtomski seem to reveal a new element in Russian policy. Formerly the Russians were indignant over Prince Bismarck's reported observation that "Russia has nothing to do in the West. Her mission is in Asia; there she represents civilization." Prince Oukhtomski is not far from holding the same opinion as did this envious foe of his country. For a few parcels of territory conquered with such difficulty in the West, what bloody wars has she not endured? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice; the Baltic, as much Scandinavian and German as Russian, closed to her on the west by the Sound and the Belts; the Black Sea, only yet half Russian, and closed on the southwest by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; and the Mediterranean itself, with England holding Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Suez Canal,—are these seas, so little available, sufficient for the needs of the expansion of the mighty continental empire that Russia is to-day? In Asia, on the contrary, who knows whether by the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, by Afghanistan and the Indus, she is not going to be able to open her way to the Indian Ocean? Who knows whether,

(1) Le prince Oukhtomski, *Voyage de Son Altesse Impériale le Czarovitch en orient*, Paris, 1898.

already mistress of the Okhotsk Sea, she will not become mistress also of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, both opening with broad outlets into the immensity of the Pacific? Now, the importance that in ancient times the Mediterranean had for mankind, and which the Atlantic possessed from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, seems to-day to be shifting to the Pacific Ocean. Of all the nations bordering on this truly universal ocean, the Russian Empire is destined to be one of the most powerful. As to territorial conquests, how are those that Russia won in little Europe, where every square mile cost her a battle, to be compared with those which, with infinitely less sacrifice and effort, she has already won, or can yet win, in Asia? Bismarck spoke in disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. Prince Oukhtomski speaks of it with pride: "The time has come for the Russians to have some definite idea regarding the heritage that the Jenghis Khans and the Tamerlanes have left us. Asia! we have been part of it at all times; we have lived its life and shared its interests; our geographical position irrevocably destines us to be the head of the rudimentary powers of the East."

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, Russia was a province of the Mongol Empire. Everything that constituted that Mongol Empire, however, is perhaps destined to become only a province of Russia. The capital will simply be transferred from Karakorum or from the shores of the Amur to the banks of the Neva.

Asiatic in their mixture of races, Asiatic in their history (conquered in the thirteenth century, conquering since the sixteenth), the Russians possess to a higher degree than either the French or the Anglo-Saxons an understanding of things Asiatic. They have all the right that is possible to supplant "those colonies of the Germanic and the Latin races that are taking unwilling Asia under their tutelage." Moreover, the true successor in Asia of the old-time czars or khans of the Finnish race is not the Bogdy-Khan who rules at Pekin, but "the White Czar who reigns at St. Petersburg." In one of the pagodas of Canton are to be seen, as Prince Oukhtomski assures us, four colossal figures, called "the kings of the four cardinal points," and Prince Oukhtomski felt confident that it was to "the King of the North" that the people rendered the greatest homage.

Laying aside these dreams of the future, let us see what, up to the present time, has been actually accomplished to bring about their realization. The efforts of the Russians throughout their history as an Asiatic power are connected with one or the other of two great movements: her southward expansion towards Persia and British India, and her eastward expansion in the regions bordering on China, Corea, and Japan.

In 1554, during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the Russians gained a foothold on the Caspian Sea by the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan and of the lower Volga. Towards the close of his life, Peter the Great

waged war on Persia, captured Derbend on the Caspian, and occupied the provinces of Daghestan, Shirvan, Ghilan, and Mazandaran, and the cities of Rasht and Astrabad. The unhealthy character of these regions made them "the cemetery of Russian armies," and the successors of the great Czar had to abandon them. A war undertaken by Catherine II., also in the last years of her reign, ended in the same result, and her son, Paul I., recalled the troops. In the region of the Caucasus, the Russians had gained a foothold, between the years 1774-1784, by the acquisition of the Kuban as far as the Terek, and, strangely enough, it was not on the northern slope of the mountains, but upon the southern that they were to begin the conquest of this Caucasus. In 1783, the King, or Czar, of Georgia, Heraclius, declared himself to be the vassal of Catherine II. in order that he might have her assistance against the Persians and the Ottomans. In 1799, his son, George XII.,[1] formally ceded his state to Paul I., although his son, David, continued to govern until 1803, when the annexation was consummated. This acquisition brought Russia into collision with the Persians and the Ottomans on one hand, and, on another, with the independent tribes of the Caucasus. By the Treaty of Gulistan, in 1813, Persia ceded to Russia Daghestan, Shirvan, and Shusha, and

(1) Dubrovine, *Georges XII., dernier tsar de Géorgie, et l'annexion à la Russie* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1897.

renounced all claims upon Georgia and other territories of the Caucasus. Another war broke out in 1826, which was terminated by the Treaty of Turkmanshai, February 22, 1828, by which Persia surrendered her two Armenian provinces[1], Nakhitchevan and Erivan. The same year, in the Treaty of Adrianople, Turkey gave over to Russia the fortresses and districts of Anapa, Poti, and Akhalzikh, and all rights (bitterly contested by the inhabitants) over Imeritia, Mingrelia, and Abkhasia. Then began, in the new possessions, the task of pacifying the wild mountaineers of these regions, and, also the Tcherkesses, or Circassians, of the northern slope. The Circassians and the Abkhasui roused to fanaticism by the soldier priest, the *Imam* Shamyl, held out against the Russians for nearly thirty years. In 1844, Russia had in the Caucasus two hundred thousand soldiers, commanded by her best generals. The capture of Védéni, in 1858, and the surrender of Shamyl, a year later, assured the pacification of the Caucasus. The increase of territory that Russia made at the expense of Turkey, in 1878, by the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, included the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Olty, and the port of Batum, and fixed the boundary line between Turkey and Russia as it has since remained.

Since the Treaty of 1828, Persia under the Shahs, Fet-Aly-Khan, Mohammed, Nasr-ed-Din, and Muzafer-

(1) Lord Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, London, 1892.

ed-Din, has fallen almost entirely under Russian influence. In 1837-38, the Shah Mohammed, with an army commanded by Russian officers, besieged Herat, defended by Afghans under the leadership of English officers. In 1856, the Shah Nasr-ed-Din, at the suggestion of Russia, besieged and captured Herat; but the English compelled him to abandon his prize, by making a descent on the Persian Gulf, where they captured the port of Bushire and the island of Karrack, which they have kept. In 1841, Persia ceded to Russia the Caspian port of Ashurada, near Astrabad; in 1881, Askabad was given to the same power, and, in 1885, Serakhs,—all three places very important strategic points on the eastern frontier. Persia has also agreed to the building of Russian railroads that are to pass through her territory and terminate on the Persian Gulf. The present year, she has negotiated a loan of twenty-two million five hundred thousand rubles through the agency of the "bank of Persia," established under Russian auspices. This loan is payable in seventy-five years, and the interest is secured by all the customs revenues of the kingdom, save those of the Persian Gulf. The Shah has bound himself not to seek further loans of any other European power, and has thereby placed himself financially in the hands of Russia. It is thus that Russia, by her diplomacy, by her banks, and by her railroads, making Persia her political and commercial vassal, has succeeded in furthering her scheme of expansion towards the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Indian Ocean.

FURTHER CONQUESTS.

EXPANSION TOWARDS INDIA—NAPOLEON—THE CONQUEST OF THE KHANS—IN AFGHANISTAN—THE "KEY OF THE INDIES"—IN TOUCH WITH INDIA—ABYSSINIA—BRITISH OVER-CONFIDENCE.

TOWARDS British India Russian expansion was to seek still other channels. The conquests in the Caucasus, which we have been reviewing, opened the way along the western and southern sides of the Caspian Sea. But for a long time the Russians had been endeavoring to turn the sea from its northern side. In the reign of the Empress Anna Ivanovna, hordes of Kirghiz, whose camping grounds lay to the east of the Ural River, submitted to Russia (1734). Her sway was then extended into Turkestan, that expanse of steppes and oases watered by the Jaxartes (Sir-Daria) and the Oxus (Amu-Daria), that empty

into the Aral Sea, a region that is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the south by Persia and Afghanistan, on the east by the Chinese Empire, and on the north by Siberia. Here was located ancient Djagatai, the debris of former Mongol Empires.[1]

When the Russians saw these vast plains spread out before them, they at first thought that they were near British India, and that an entrance to that rich peninsula would be as easy to them as it had been to so many Asiatic conquerors that had gone forth from the steppes of Turkestan or the valleys of Afghanistan. From this conviction was born the first schemes that the Russians entertained for the conquest of Hindustan. Even Peter the Great thought of it. In 1717, he sent against Khiva an expedition under Peter Békovitch that perished on the way. A certain A. M. de Saint Génie proposed a plan for the conquest of Hindustan to Catherine II. in 1791; but the most celebrated of all these projects was the one

(1) Subsequently it was broken up into numerous states, the principal ones being the khanate of Khokand, with its chief cities Turkistan, Tashkend, Tchimkend, and Khodjend on the upper Jaxartes, or Sir-Daria; the khanate of Balkh (ancient Bactria), and the khanate of Samarkand, fallen into dependency upon the khanate of Bokhara, on the upper Oxus, or Amu-Daria; the khanate of Khiva on the lower Oxus; and on the Kashgar and Yarkand Rivers emptying into Lake Lob-Nor, and the Ili flowing into Lake Balkash, khanates (Kashgar, Yarkand, and Kuldja) that belonged to China. Outside of the districts inhabited by a settled people are the deserts

that Paul I. submitted to Napoleon Bonaparte, then first Consul of the French Republic, whose ally against England he had become. The plan was to place two armies in the field. General Knorring, with the Cossacks of the Don and other Russian troops, was to march by Khiva and Bokhara to the upper Indus, while thirty-five thousand French and thirty-five thousand Russians, that Paul I., inspired by chivalric generosity, proposed placing under the command of Masséna, the conqueror of the Russians at the battle of Zürich, were to unite at Astrabad on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. Thence they were to make their way by Herat and Kandahar to the upper Indus to join forces with the other army. Then, altogether, French, Russians, Persians, Turcomans, and Afghans, they would pour down into India, proclaiming to the princes and the people of the peninsula the fall of English tyranny and their independence. "All the treasures of India were to be their recompense." The execution of this plan was even begun. The Cos-

of sand over which wander nomadic tribes. To the north of the Jaxartes, are the Kirghiz, divided into several hordes, and the Turkomans, or Turkmens, on the east of the Caspian Sea.—Consult Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*, vol. i., *Transkaspian und seine Eisenbahn*, vol. ii., *Mittel-Asien*, Leipzig, 1898-99. Makchéef, *Coup d'oeil historique sur le Turkestan et la marche progressive des Russes* (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1890. Albrecht, *Russisches Central-Asien*, Hamburg, 1896. H. Mozer, *À travers l'Asie centrale*, Paris, 1885.

sacks of the Don, under their *ataman*, Orlof-Denissof, were already across the Volga, when the news of the death of Paul I. recalled them to their camps.[1]

The visionary character of this scheme has been demonstrated, during the present century, by the difficulties that the Russian armies have had to encounter in winning their way over a very small fraction of the immense journey marked out in 1800. At the cost of enormous effort, the oases of Turkestan, which in the mind of Paul I. were to be simply halting places in the long march, have had to be conquered one by one; one by one, deep valleys and rocky bluffs, defended by warlike tribes, have had to be captured and held. To-day, even with these avenues of approach secured, the goal seems as far off as it did to the optimistic imagination of the Czar Paul I. In 1839, Nicholas I., wishing to punish the Khan of Khiva, who was capturing Russian merchants and pillaging Russian caravans, despatched a body of troops commanded by General Pérovski. The severe

(1) General Batorski, *Projets d'expédition dans l'Indoustan sous Napoléon, Paul I., et Alexandre I.*, (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1886. H. S. Edwards, *Russian Projects against India.* On the Russian Expedition in Turkestan, see Hugo Stumin, *Rapports, Khiva* (translated from the German), Paris, 1874; A. N. Kouropatkine (at present Russian Minister of War), *Turcomania and the Turcomans* (translated into English from the Russian by Robert Mitchell); Skobelef, *Rapports sur les campagnes de 1879-1881* (English translation, London, 1881); Marvin, *Russian Campaigns Among the Tekke-Turcomans* (from Russian official sources).

winters of the steppes and the deep snow compelled him, when half way to his destination, to return. Nevertheless, the Khan, intimidated by this demonstration, liberated the Russian prisoners (1840), and in 1842 consented to acknowledge the over-lordship of Russia. Two years later, the eastern Kirghiz also submitted. In order to protect these new subjects against the Khan of Khokand it was necessary to wage war with the latter. From 1860 to 1864, the leaders of the Russian troops, Pérovski, Kolpakovski, Vérévkine, Tchernaïeff, captured the fortresses of Ak-Mesjed, Turkestan, Aulié-Ata, Tchimkend, and finally, Tashkend, a city of one hundred thousand souls, and the commercial emporium of that region.

The Emir of Bokhara attempted to intervene, and had a "holy war" preached by the fanatical Mollahs; but he was conquered in the battle of Irjar (1866), and promised to pay a war indemnity.

However far the Russians might still be from the frontier of India, England was nevertheless disturbed at their success. The official journals of St. Petersburg amused themselves with pacific declarations, announcing that there was no intention of conquering Bokhara; but the Czar organized the territories, already submissive, into "the general government of Turkestan," and General Kaufmann was placed in control. The Emir of Bokhara, having refused to deliver the war indemnity that he had promised, was defeated at Zera-Bulak, and

was compelled to sign the treaty of 1868, by which he ceded to the Russians the khanates of Samarkand and Zerafshan; recognized a Russian protectorate, and paid an indemnity of two million rubles. The khanate of Khokand became, likewise, a vassal state.

The Khan of Khiva continued to pillage caravans, and to hold in slavery Russian merchants. In 1873, three bodies of troops were sent against him; one coming from the shores of the Caspian Sea under General Markozof, the second from Orenburg under General Vérévkine, the third from Tashkend under Governor-General Kaufmann. The first, after a difficult march through the burning sands of the desert, was compelled to fall back. The other two entered Khiva almost without striking a blow. The Khan was obliged to acknowledge himself the vassal of "the White Czar," to cede all that part of his territory situated on the right bank of the Oxus; to grant the Russians the rights of navigation and commerce, and to submit to a war indemnity that exhausted his finances. The Khans that had yielded to the Russians were now the objects of the scorn and hatred of the more fanatical among their Mohammedan subjects. These did not cease to rise in revolt against them. The Khan of Khokand preferred to surrender his territories to Russia; and they were formed into the new province of Ferghana, in 1875. The same year, the Khan of Khiva offered to surrender his in exchange for a pension. The Russians did not wish to annex

either this khanate or that of Bokhara, less through fear of English protests than because the existence of two vassal Khans would allow them to conceal the better their political plans. They maintain them on their thrones by paying them a pension. To-day, the Khan of Bokhara is captain of a regiment of Terek Cossacks, and the Khan of Khiva is lieutenant-general of the Orenburg Cossacks.

In 1851, the Russians had obtained from China some commercial advantages in the Kuldja province. Twenty years afterwards a Mohammedan adventurer, Yakub-Khan seized the Chinese khanates of Kashgar and Yarkand, and incited a Mohammedan rebellion in Kuldja. The Russians entered the province, giving China to understand that they would remain there until order was reëstablished (1871). They would gladly have annexed it; but Chinese troops had been despatched; and, after years of marching, they arrived in Kashgar (where Yakub had been assassinated in 1877), and upon the Kuldja frontier. The Russians first thought of resisting the troops and holding the province; but the territory in dispute did not seem worth the risk of a war with China. By the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881, they gave back Kuldja, except one district on the river Ili, and renounced their military position in Kashgar in exchange for certain commercial advantages.

To complete the conquest of Turkestan, it remained for them to subdue the nomadic Turcomans (Tekke-

Turcomans). This was the object of the brilliant campaigns directed by Skobelef, who carried by assault the fortress of Geok-Tepe on January 24, 1881, with a loss to the enemy of eight thousand men. Then he took Askhabad, which was afterwards ceded by Persia.[1]

The agreement with Persia and the conquest of Turkestan brought Russia's power to the frontier of Afghanistan, which the English regard as the protecting wall of their Indian Empire. At every forward movement of the Russians, they protested or endeavored to secure guarantees against a new advance or tried to gain for themselves some new strategic point that would strengthen their position. They were not always successful. After the first siege of Herat by the Persians, in 1840, the English made the conquest of Kabul. Their army was driven out by an insurrection, and totally annihilated while retreating (1841). If, to save their honor, they afterwards recaptured Kabul, prudence led them to adandon it as quickly as possible (1842). After the annexation or subjection of the khanates by the Russians, the English again made their way into Kabul, and left there a resident representative, Cavagnari; but a

(1) Colonel Mallesson, *The Russo-Afghan Question*, 1864. Sir Henry Rawlinson, *Later Phases of the Central Asia Question*, 1875. Kouropatkine, *Les confines anglo-russes* (translated from the Russian by G. le Marchand), Paris, 1879. P. Lessar, *La Russie et l'Angleterre en Asie centrale*, Paris. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat, etc.*

popular uprising, in 1879, brought about the murder of Cavagnari and eighty-seven of his retinue. The expedition sent to avenge this insult was led by General Roberts,[1] whom we see to-day in South Africa operating against the Boers. This expedition, however, brought about as little definite result as did the former intervention in Afghanistan.

In 1881, the English had gained from the Russians the assurance that they had no intention of annexing the city of Merv, a very important strategic point; but in 1884, the notables of that city presented themselves to the Russian commander at Askhabad, and made declaration that they accepted the lordship of "the White Czar." The English made complaint to the cabinet at St. Petersburg. They were answered that the action of the people of Merv had been a surprise to the Russians themselves; but that they believed that they would have committed a great mistake by rejecting a submission that was so entirely voluntary. The English had secured the appointment of an Anglo-Russian commission for settling the disputed boundaries, which was to decide whether Penjdeh, another very important point, belonged to their client, the Emir of Afghanistan, or to the Turcoman subjects of Russia. The English commissioners, presided over by General Lumsden, were the first to arrive at the place

(1) General, now Marshal, Lord Roberts has published a work, *Forty-one Years in India.*

of meeting. They began by fortifying Herat and inciting the Afghans to seize Penjdeh. Seeing this, the chief Russian commissioner, General Komarof, at the head of a strong Russian force, occupied the Zulfikar Pass, and made ready to march upon Penjdeh. While on the way thither, he was attacked by the Afghans at Kushk. He slew five hundred of their men, captured two of their flags and all their artillery (March 30, 1885). Then the English commissioners withdrew, charging Komarof with having been the aggressor. Great Britain was much irritated. Gladstone, who had the Egyptian Soudan and the Upper Burmah wars on his hands, called upon Parliament for subsidies. The belief was general that a war was about to ensue between "the whale and the elephant." Then England calmed down, and accepted the explanation of the Russians, that the fight at Kushk was the result of a "mistake." In 1885 and 1887, she agreed to the Russian occupation of Merv, Penjdeh, Kushk, and the Zulfikar Pass. The Russians were now within one hundred and twenty kilometres of Herat, known for so long a time as the "key of the Indies."

The question of the settlement of the boundaries was scarcely disposed of, when another question presented itself in the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs. These form a plateau of from four to five thousand metres in altitude, known as the "roof of the world," with a rigorous climate and sparse population. This plateau commands both Afghanistan and Cashmere,

those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan. It was broken up into petty khanates, over which the Khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the Emir of Afghanistan, the client of the English, laid claim to sovereignty. Neither of them had recognized until then the value of the territory. An "expedition for study," accompanied by six hundred Russian soldiers, made its appearance in Pamir in the summer of 1891, and aroused, by its presence there, the protests of the English. At the approach of winter, the Russians withdrew; but they again appeared the following summer, in larger numbers, under the command of Colonel Yanof. They claimed that they were insulted by the Afghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat of Somatash (July 12,), after which they fell back and took up their position at Kalabery on the Oxus. This clash of arms was succeeded by a diplomatic controversy. It was not until 1895, after a keen discussion between the two great powers, each contending for its own client, that they reached an agreement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of Shugnan and Roschan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan, a narrow strip of territory, from twenty to thirty kilometres wide, which now forms "a buffer state" between the great empires of Russia and Great Britain. Even after this agreement, Russia found a pretext in 1899 for occupying the district of Sirikul, which belongs to Chinese Pamir, and which

commands the source of the Kashgar and Yarkand Rivers (March, 1899).

Great Britain having occupied in Arabia the island of Perim in the *imamate* of Muscat, in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea, and to establish a coaling station in her maritime route, Russia, in 1899, also endeavored to obtain from the *Imam* the grant of a coaling station on his coast. From this arose new complaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England. Russia also established herself, under color of orthodox proselytism, at a point quite as annoying to British interests, on the coast, and at the very capital of Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia. A first attempt in this direction was made in 1889 by a Russian adventurer, calling himself Achinof, "the free Cossack." He took possession of the dismantled fort of Sugallo on the territory of the French colony of Obock. The former "*anounada* of Sugallo" drove him away, and the Russian government disavowed his action. The mission of Lieutenant Machkof (1889-1892), and the so-called "scientific mission" of Captain Léontief in 1894, thanks to the ready assistance of the French authorities, succeeded much better. Thus was Russian influence, in close harmony with French influence, established almost upon the British Nile. In 1898, the Russian Colonel, Artamonof, with some Abyssinian troops, endeavored to meet Major Marchand, who was moving upon Fashoda, and to reinforce him on the great river.

The English alternate between doubting and believing that these expansive movements of Russia by way of the Caucasus, by way of Turkestan, and by way of the Pamirs, are all directed towards one goal, the very one that the Czar Paul proposed to the first Consul Bonaparte in 1800; Alexander I. to the Emperor Napoleon (1807); and General Duhamel to Nicholas I. (1855), and the ardent Skobelef to his government. To many intelligent Englishmen, the goal of so much effort can be no other than the conquest of India. Now that the frontier of the Russian Pamir is not more than twenty or thirty kilometres from the kingdom of Cashmere, and now that Kushk, the terminus of the Turkestan railroad system, is only one hundred and twenty kilometres from Herat, the problem of invading India is infinitely more easy than it was in the time of Bonaparte and Paul I. Why have the Russians spent so much money and blood in the conquest of the impoverished and barbarous nations of those sandy deserts and almost inaccessible mountains, if they did not have before them, as a recompense for their sacrifices, what Paul I. called "all the riches of the Indies."

A recent historian of Russian expansion,[1] Alexis Krause, reviewing all the hardships endured by Russia and the thankless task that she has assumed, adds, "On

(1) Alexis Krause, *Russia in Asia, a Record and a Study*, London and New York, 1899.

its own account, the conquest of Central Asia is worthless. It is not done in ignorance, but by carefully thought-out design, as part of a programme, the execution of which its possession will assist. The capture of the khanates was attempted, not as a pathway towards the coveted Persian Gulf, but as a road which would lead to the Panjab and all that is beyond. And now that preliminary steps have been completed, the serious undertaking is about to be begun."

James MacGahan, one of the best informed men on Eastern affairs, wrote from the shores of the Oxus in 1876: "The Russians are steadily advancing towards India, and they will, sooner or later, acquire a position in Central Asia which will enable them to threaten it. Should England be engaged in a European war, then, indeed, Russia will probably strike a blow at England's Indian power."

Other Englishmen pretend to believe that the hypothesis of a conquest of India "is too preposterous to be entertained. It would involve the most terrible and lingering war the world has ever seen. On the day that a Russian army leaves Balkh or Herat for Kandahar, well may the British commander exclaim: 'Now hath the Lord delivered them into my hand!'"

It is thus that Lord Curzon, the present Governor-General of India, expresses himself. It seems, however, that he is but assuming a tone of assured certainty to conceal his deep anxiety. This plan of conquest that

he considers "too preposterous to be entertained," has been discussed by other, and very competent persons, who do not reach conclusions so optimistic as regards Great Britain.[1] Perhaps, however, the Russians are at present pressing so closely towards the frontier of British India in order to have at their disposal a means of intimidation, or even of coercion, for use in those very frequent occasions in which Great Britain sets herself in stubborn opposition to Russia's plans in other parts of the world. For, at the present moment, the Czar Nicholas II. seems much more interested in expansion in the Far East than in any movement towards the south of Asia.

(1) Maximilian Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, *Das Vordringen der Russischen Macht in Asien*, Berlin, 1900.

In the Far East

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST.[1]

THE OPENING OF SIBERIA—VALUE OF SIBERIA—CHINESE WARS —SETTLEMENTS ON THE PACIFIC—CHINESE CESSIONS—VLADIVOSTOCK—RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AT PEKIN.

THE eastward expansion of Russia through the solitudes of Siberia and among its barbarous tribes began about the close of the sixteenth century, immediately after the conquest of the Tartar czarates of Kazan and Astrakhan. It was between the years 1579 and 1584 that the Cossack, Irmak Timofévitch, fleeing from the punishment of the law and the wrath of the Czar, Ivan the Terrible, with a handful of brigands like himself, Russians, Cossacks, Tartars, German and Polish prisoners of war, to the number of six hundred and fifty men, crossed the Ural,

(1) Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*, vol. iii. *Sibirien und die grosse sibirische Eisenbahn*, vol. iv. *Russland in Ost-Asien*, Leipzig, 1897, 1898. Legros, *La Sibérie*, Paris, 1899.

traversed the immense, untrodden forests of the Tobol, defeated the Tartar Khan, Kutchum, took Sibir, his capital, and subjected to tribute the tribes of the Irtysh and the Obi. When Irmak Timofévitch was drowned in the Irtysh, dragged to the bottom of the river by the weight of the cuirass given him by the Czar, Russia made a hero, and the Orthodox Church a saint, of the old outlaw. Along the pathways that he had marked out, there soon followed a stream of "good fellows" of every description, gold-seekers, fur-hunters, and peasants fleeing the estates of their feudal lords in search of government lands that they might cultivate as freemen. Hither also flocked religious dissenters, persecuted by the Orthodox Church, who found a shelter in the immensity of the Siberian forest, retreats concealed from all mankind. Into this same wilderness escaped the German, Polish, and Swedish prisoners of war of Peter I. and of Catherine II. Then, in long, wretched troops came in chains or in fetters the unhappy serfs deported by their masters, often bearing the marks of cruel beating and mutilation; their sides scarred by the knout, and nostrils or tongue cut by the executioner; strewing the highways with their corpses. This barbarous feature of the old Russian penal code came to an end at the close of the last century, and it is known that the present Czar, Nicholas II., has suppressed deportation into Siberia for common law crimes in order to purify that colony of a reproach like to that against which the English colonies of

Australia long protested. The rapidity with which colonization of every kind was spread over the millions of kilometers which the immensity of Siberia measures, is shown by the dates of the founding of the principal towns: Tobolsk on the Tobol in 1587; Tomsk on the Toms, a branch of the Obi, in 1604; Yeniseisk on the Yenisei in 1619; Yakoutsk in 1632; Atchinsk in 1642; Nertchinsk on the Shilka, a branch of the Amur, in 1654; Okhotsk on the sea of the same name in 1638.

Siberia, even to our own times, has been valuable mainly on account of its immense extent and the liberty that free immigrants have found there. It may be divided into three divisions: in the north, the *toundra*, marshy in summer, a mass of ice in winter; in the centre, the *taïga*, or forest, dear to the hunter; in the south, the cultivated region, of an area thrice that of all France. Even this last division, except in the districts where the "black earth" is found, is not characterized by a fertility that redeems the severity of a climate, extreme in its summer heat as in its winter cold. In the seventeenth century a belief was current that the region about the Amur was, on the contrary, of great fertility, a belief which experience has shown to be ill-founded. It was, therefore, in this direction that the most venturesome Cossacks and the most energetic settlers hastened. They were not disturbed by the fact that the country belonged to the Chinese Emperor. In 1649, a young officer

named Khabarof, undertook to descend the still unexplored river, building forts at the junction of the tributaries, conquering rebellious tribes of natives, and fighting troops of Manchurian horsemen (1649–1652). In 1658, Pachkof, governor of Yeniseik, founded Nertchinsk on the Shilka, a branch of the Amur. Five years later Albasin was founded. This was a fortress with ramparts of wood, and in its vicinity there arose many Russian villages. Finally, the Chinese, irritated at seeing these adventurers assume rulership over them, several times attacked Albasin with armies of from fifteen to twenty thousand men; but were invariably repulsed. Upon receiving tidings of these events, the court at Moscow sent envoys to that of Pekin with a letter written in Latin and in Russian. After long deliberation at Nertchinsk a treaty was signed in that city, in 1689, in accordance with the terms of which the heroic fort of Albasin was to be razed; and the frontier between the two empires was definitely fixed as it continued to be observed by both countries down to the treaties of 1858.

On their side, the Russians renounced further forcible encroachment and settlement on Chinese territory; but they did not renounce their efforts to gain a foothold by commerce, religious mission work, and diplomacy in the Middle Kingdom, and even in Pekin itself. The Russians that had been made prisoners at Albasin, or in battles at other places, had been taken to the capital of the empire. Some of them had established themselves there as artisans

or merchants; others formed the Russian guard of the "Son of Heaven." At Moscow it was known that these men were well treated at Pekin, but that they had neither church nor priest of their religion. Peter the Great resolved to send an embassy to Pekin to secure satisfactory concessions on this point. This, indeed, was the object of a mission entrusted to Eberhard Ysbrand, who reached Pekin in 1693, and there obtained what the Czar wished. In 1721, Tsmaïlof was despatched to the Chinese capital to secure from the Emperor Kanghi the privilege of establishing there a permanent Russian legation. He gave the Bodgy-Khan a letter from the Czar and left M. de Lange as *chargé d'affaires*; but the latter almost immediately after Tsmaïlof's departure was dismissed by the Chinese court. In 1727, a treaty that secured greater commercial privileges for the Russians was signed at Kiakhta. In 1806, Golovine, another envoy, was sent to Pekin with a view to obtaining the free navigation of the Amur River. This mission failed; nevertheless the position of Russia in the Asiatic East was continually growing stronger. In 1807, they had annexed the peninsula of Kamtchatka. In 1847, Count Nicholas Muravief, who was to win the surname of Amourski, became governor of Eastern Siberia, and set himself to develop and strengthen the colony. He perceived that it would have no future if possession was not secured of the chief river and the richest province of the region, that is, of the Amur and of Manchuria. The river was

still so incompletely known that the Grand Chancellor Nesselrode declared to the Emperor Nicholas that its outlet was inaccessible. In 1848, a Cossack expedition, under Vaganof, perished without the escape of a single person to tell the tale. Two years afterwards Captain Nevelskoï discovered that Saghalin is really an island, separated from the mainland by the channel or strait of Tartary, and, in the course of his exploration, came upon the mouth of the Amur, entered it in a small boat, and planted the Russian flag on its banks; proclaiming to the natives that the country belonged to the "White Czar" at St. Petersburg. The Grand Chancellor was terrified at Nevelskoï's audacity; he already saw himself at war with China; he insisted that the daring captain's action be discountenanced, but the Emperor replied: "When Russia's flag has been raised anywhere it should not be taken down." On his part, Governor Muravief endeavored to persuade the local mandarins that the best thing to do was to leave the Russians alone. The Chinese demanded that negotiations be entered upon with their Emperor; Muravief thought that Pekin was too far away for that and that Chinese diplomacy was too slow. He continued to act, therefore, as if the country was already a Russian province, and strengthened his position by building along the river the forts Alexandrovsk, Mikhaïlovsk, and Nicolaïevsk,—all of these baptismal names of the royal family. Pétropavlosk, on the southeast coast of Kamtchatka, had been established

in 1740. Other fortresses arose at the junction of the several principal tributaries of the Amur River. "The Amur will be the death of you," said the Emperor Nicholas jestingly to Muravief.

During the Crimean War the Anglo-French fleet blockaded the Russian Pacific coast, and destroyed a part of the military establishments and of the infant marine. This blockade, by threatening to starve out the colony, only hastened a decision upon the part of Muravief, who had need of Manchuria to furnish food for his colonists. Its annexation was already an accomplished fact, when, in 1857, Admiral Putiatin dropped anchor in the Gulf of Pechili and proposed to the Chinese Emperor, in consideration of Russia's armed intervention in the Taiping rebellion, the cession of Manchuria. China's only reply was a vigorous protest against Russian encroachment. War seemed imminent between the two empires. Fortunately for Russia, just at that time came the Anglo-French expedition and the march of the allies upon Pekin. The Russians profited by this event to complete the annexation of the coveted territory. The Czar sent a fleet into the Chinese waters, and the Celestials did not relish having a third European power to deal with. By the Treaties of Aigun and Tientsin in 1858, they granted to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur, the entire territory between that river and the ocean as well as its tributary stream, the Ossuri, the bay on which there was, in time, to rise the fortress of Vladivostock,

with its prophetic name (Dominator of the East). These newly acquired lands formed two provinces, the Amur Province and the Maritime Province. By the Treaty of Pekin, in 1860, China ceded to Russia the region adjacent to the lakes Balkash and Issik-kul; the boundary line between Manchuria and Siberia was re-adjusted, and the Russians were granted the right to trade in all parts of the empire. Fifteen years more, and Russia obtained from Japan the abandonment of the latter's rights over Saghalin in exchange for the North Kurile Isles.

For nearly thirty years the boundary between China and Russia remained as agreed upon in the treaties of 1858 and 1860. But already the commercial and political activity of the Russians was overstepping it. They had established themselves in large numbers in the cities of Chinese Manchuria,—in Kiakhta, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar, the residence of the mandarin-governor. The navigation of the Ossuri and the Sungari Rivers fell wholly into their hands. The steamships of the Amur Company put Russia in rapid communication with Japan and San Francisco. "Scientific Missions" traversed China in all directions. At Pekin the Russian colony acquired a continually greater importance and the ambassador of the Czar wielded more influence at court than the representatives of any other European power. His open handed liberality won him the favor of the courtiers, the mandarins, and the generals. In all the sea and river ports, the colonies of Russian merchants mul-

tiplied, and these seemed to live on better terms with the native population than the traders of other foreign nations. On the arrival of the Czarovitch, in 1891, he was honored with a series of royal entertainments.

COREA.

THE CHINA–JAPAN WAR—INTERFERENCE OF RUSSIA—CONFLICT WITH JAPANESE INTERESTS—RUSSIA'S GAIN.

HINA and Japan, "The Middle Kingdom," and "The Land of the Rising Sun," the *Bogdy-Khan* and the *Mikado*, had disputed with each other for a long time, the protectorate of the kingdom of Corea. War broke out between the two empires in the July of 1894. The Japanese troops, drilled and equipped in the European manner, were everywhere victorious. Their warships, built in the best shipyards of Europe, sank the Chinese vessels. The Japanese occupied all Corea, stormed and captured Port Arthur, conquered a part of Chinese Manchuria, captured Wei-hai-Wei, threatened Pekin, and finally imposed upon China the Treaty of Shimonosaki, April 17, 1895. China was compelled to renounce all her claims with respect to Corea; to give to her conquerors the Island of Formosa, the Pescadores, the peninsula of Liao-tung,

with Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, to open five new ports, including Pekin, to their commerce; to grant them the right to open manufacturing establishments in the empire; and to pay a war indemnity of seven hundred and fifty millions.[1]

The success of the Japanese had been so rapid that all the European powers were surprised at this sudden revelation of such a military and naval strength in the hands of the Mikado. England, at first hostile and malevolent, hastened to show more friendly feelings for the conqueror; the United States concluded a commercial treaty with the Japanese government; and all the plans that Russia had formed for supremacy in the Far East were threatened with failure. She could not allow either Wei-hai-Wei or the peninsula of Liao-tung, with the harbors that she had so long coveted, to remain in the hands of the Japanese. Should she do so, she would see herself relegated to the ports of Siberia and Northern Manchuria, closed by ice for a part of the year, and her hope of unfolding her colors in the seas of the Far East taken from her. She could not permit that the influence of triumphant Japan should be substituted at Pekin for her own influence, already dating back a century or more. It was necessary, at any cost, even should it mean war, to prevent the provisions of the Shimonosaki Treaty being carried out. She was successful in enlisting

(1) Vladimir, *The China-Japan War, compiled from Japanese, Chinese, and Foreign Sources*, London, Sampson Low, 1896.

the coöperation of two states which, although antagonistic to each other, had reasons for keeping the good-will of Russia. These three powers:—Russia, France, and Germany,—formed what might be called "A Triple Alliance of the Far East." They forwarded to the court at Tokyo some "friendly advice" regarding the giving up of claims that might bring about a general conflagration. It was hard for Japan to renounce the Liao-tung peninsula, with its harbors of Port Arthur, Talien-Wan, and Wei-hai-Wei, that had been conquered at the price of its blood, and by such brilliant victories; but the Japanese armies were on the Chinese mainland; the three powers were masters of the sea; and thus the island empire was left almost without defence. The three protesting powers had the advantage. Russia, in the deliberations over the revision of the treaty, showed such passionate insistence that twice, May 5, and May 8, Admiral Tyrtof made all preparations to meet the Japanese fleet, which probably would have gone to the bottom. By the Treaty of Tokyo, May 8, 1895, Japan agreed to give up the Liao-tung and Wei-hai-Wei; to be satisfied with Formosa and the Pescadores, positions of the utmost importance in the Pacific; and to receive the war indemnity and certain commercial privileges.

As a matter of fact, Russia had just inflicted upon Japan the treatment that she herself had received from the European powers, after so many splendid victories over the Turks. It was under the pressure of a

"European Concert" that Japan lost the most precious fruits of her success against the Chinese, just as the Russian conquerors of the Ottomans had lost theirs. Russia set up against Japan the principle of the integrity of the Chinese Empire in exactly the same way that the powers had imposed upon her the principle of the preservation of the Turkish Empire. The Treaty of Tokyo in 1895, modified the Treaty of Shimonosaki as completely as had the Treaty of Berlin modified that of San Stefano in 1878. Just as Russia, in 1878, had had the mortification of seeing her political foes, Austria and England, enrich themselves with the spoils of that very Turkish Empire that they pretended to protect against her covetousness, laying their hands, the one on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other upon the island of Cyprus; so Japan had soon the mortification of seeing Russia violate, for her own profit, that very principle of the continental integrity of the Chinese Empire that she had set up against Japanese ambition.

CHINA.

Russian Concessions—Port Arthur—Railways—Loans—Corea—Germany—Great Britain—The United States.

ENGLAND and France, the former in particular, obtained from China numerous important concessions[1]; but of more value were those that Russia secured. By the convention of June, 1895, China contracted with her, through the intermediary of the Russo-Chinese bank, recently established at St. Petersburg, and under the direction of Count Oukhtomski, whose Oriental policy we know, a loan of four hundred million francs at four per cent, payable in thirty-six years. On October 25, 1896, this same bank made another agreement with the Pekin government. This agreement, ratified by the Czar, became, on

(1) R. I. Pinon et J. de Marcillac, *La Chine qui s'ouvre*, Paris, 1900. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, *La rénovation de l'Asie: Sibérie, Chine, Japon*, Paris, 1900. Chas. Beresford, *The Break-up of China*, London and New York, 1899.

December 26, the Treaty of St. Petersburg. It gives the Eastern Chinese Railroad Company the right to build a road through Chinese Manchuria, making it a branch line of the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad; to develop coal and other mines in the territory traversed by the road, and to devote itself to all other industrial and commercial enterprises. The stock of the company can be held by Chinese and Russians only, which means that it will fall almost exclusively into the hands of the Russians. A special clause authorized the Czar to station in Manchuria both infantry and cavalry for the protection of the railroad. This was the disguised annexation of all the part of the vast province that had not already been ceded to Russia in 1858 and 1860. Furthermore, China leased to Russia for fifteen years a harbor in the province of Shantung, and finally, Russian war-ships were given the privileges of the two harbors of Liao-tung peninsula, Port Arthur and Talien-Wan.

March 27, 1898, there was formulated a new agreement between the two countries. Port Arthur and Talien-Wan and all their dependencies were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five years. With this was granted the privilege of building through the Liao-tung peninsula a railroad from Vladivostock to Port Arthur, which is to be merely another branch of the Trans-Siberian road.

Nor is this all. According to a still more recent agreement, a Russian railroad is to be built from Mukden

in Manchuria to Pekin. Another Russian company is to construct a system of Chinese railroads, the three principal lines of which, setting out from Pekin, are to traverse, the first two, the provinces of Shansi and Ho-nan, the third, the province of Hupé and to terminate at Hankow on the Yang-tse-kiang. Against this third railroad, England made a vigorous protest. In her treaties with China, she had secured for herself the building of railroads and the commerce of the valley of the Yang-tse, and here the Russians were coming to cut off her railroads, and in the very heart of China to draw off the merchandise that she was counting upon to export by sea, and which was now likely to be carried by the Trans-Siberian line. After having secured the defeat at Pekin of the propositions of a Franco-Russian syndicate, she encouraged two Chinese of high rank to apply for a contract to build the debated railroad. They found themselves unable to raise the necessary funds, and it was then that Russia, thanks to the energy of Count Oukhtomski, had the franchise transferred to a Franco-Belgian company.

Nevertheless, in November, 1897, Russia had either not the ability or the wish to prevent the Germans from landing in the bay of Kiao-chow, which she seemed to have reserved for herself, or from securing a lease of it for ninety-nine years. Neither could she hinder the English, incensed at the action of the Germans, from obtaining, in April, 1898, a lease of the harbor and bay

of Wei-hai-Wei, evacuated by the Japanese. It thus happens that in the Pechili Gulf, from which Pekin receives the greater part of its supplies, three European powers occupy places very near one another; the Russians at Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, the Germans at Kiao-chow, and the English at Wei-hai-Wei. The Pechili Gulf has become another Mediterranean, on whose shores rival Asiatic interests continue the rivalries of Europe. The position of Russia is much the strongest. She commands Pekin, not merely by sea, but by all the overland highways. She alone of the three rival powers in the Pechili Gulf possesses a vast continental base of operations. She fronts China along a boundary line several thousand miles in length; she embraces and penetrates China; and she alone by her railroads, the Trans-Siberian, the Trans-Manchurian, and the Trans-Chinese, will be able to pour into the very centre of China and into its capital a great European army. Recently in the revolution of the palace, which took place in Pekin in September, 1898, it was manifest to what degree the influence of the Russian legation there was preponderant. The young Emperor, Kwang-Su, supported by Japan, and perhaps also by England, endeavored to shake off the tutelage of the Empress-Dowager, Tsu-Hsi, and of the viceroy, Li-Hung-Chang, the friend of the Russians, in order that he might inaugurate an era of reforms. The plot was discovered, the accomplices of the Emperor were executed or ban-

ished, and the Empress-Dowager reassumed full power.

In Corea, Russia has taken the place of China in the long-standing rivalry that the latter has carried on with Japan. At Seoul, in the palace of King Li-hui, it is the Russian faction which, as a conservative party, has taken the place of the old Chinese faction in opposition to the Japanese faction, which constitutes the progressive party of Corea. Japan and Russia dispute with each other not only political influences, but commercial exploitation. Russia might employ force, but she fears lest Japan, the Great Britain of the Far East, may throw herself into an alliance with the Great Britain of Europe. Therefore, Russia now openly opposes Japan, and now again craftily manipulates her. In spite of the keenness of the contention, she has had the shrewdness never to push matters to a rupture. In a series of agreements, dated May 14, 1896, February 24, 1897, April 25, 1898, respectively, the two rivals have attempted to define the conditions of this sort of *condominium* and to establish an equitable division of commercial advantages, of mail and telegraph monopoly, and of police force. In this division, however, Russia seems to have secured the lion's share. She possesses in Corea a system of telegraph lines which is annexed to her Siberian lines; she has managed to have the financial administration of the kingdom entrusted to Russians, and has succeeded in having King Li-hui issue an edict that the future railways of Corea shall be of the same guage as those of Siberia.

With France in Tonquin and the region round about; Germany in Kiao-chow; England at Wei-hai-Wei, on the Blue River, and in the peninsula of Kelung before Hong-Kong; with Russia throughout all north China; the Japanese in Corea, in Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the United States in the Philippines,—it can be seen that the political problems of the Far East have become as complicated as the like problems have ever been in Europe or America.

THE MEANS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION.

Fruits of Diplomacy—Absolutism of Russian Government—An Enlightened Despotism—Russian Colonists—Race Characteristics — Religion — Population — Franco-Russian Alliance—From the Baltic to the Pacific.

E have followed Russia in all the directions that her policy of expansion has carried her. It now remains for us to study the means that she has employed, especially in what concerns her expansion in the East.

The essential characteristic that distinguishes her Oriental from her Western policy is, that, while nearly all the progress she has made in Europe has been either the cause or the result of bloody wars like those of the Czars of Moscow against Poland, of Peter the Great against Charles XII., of Catherine II. and Alexander II. against the Ottomans, of Paul I. against the French Republic, of Alexander I. against Napoleon, and of Nicholas I. against the Allies in the Crimea, her Oriental expansions have never brought her into war with a power of the first magnitude, not even with China. However bellicose Russia may have shown herself in Europe, in

Asia she has exhibited a prudence wholly Oriental. A score of times it has seemed that she was on the brink of a mighty war with Great Britain over the frontiers of India; with China over Albasin, Kuldja, or Manchuria; and with Japan over Liao-tung and Corea. Some sort of an agreement has always come in time to ward off an open rupture, as in 1872, 1885, 1887, and 1895, with Great Britain; and as at Nertchinsk, at Aïgun, at Tientsin, and at Pekin with China. In 1871, war with the latter seemed imminent with respect to the Kuldja question, but, rather than proceed to extreme measures, Russia preferred to abandon a part of her conquest. In these agreements Russia, it is found, has generally the better part of the bargain. She understands how to utilize the *amour-propre* of her adversaries. Thus, she helped the Chinese "to save their face," for example, by inducing them to lease for twenty-five or ninety-nine years what they would obstinately have refused to cede definitely. Thanks to this expedient, it appeared to the Chinese that the dignity and integrity of their empire would remain inviolate. England also has grown accustomed to allowing herself "to save her face," and to be put to sleep by the mesmeric passes, energetic, and at the same time, caressing of Russian diplomacy. She allows herself to see in the "explanations" brought to London, the proof that some bold Cossack raid, some thorough lesson administered to her Afghan clients, is the result of an "error," a "misunderstanding." A company of six

hundred soldiers is almost always a "scientific expedition." The English minister, in order not to stir up strife, allows himself to yield, and hands over to his successor the task of disentangling the knot. This successor is careful not to meddle with what he himself was not mixed up in, and what the jingoes and London cockneys have already forgotten; and so what the Russians have skillfully acquired remains permanently in their possession. If the occasion demands it, they will declare that they did not intend to conquer Bokhara; but have they proved that they have not made a vassal state of it, something that will be more useful to them than an annexed province? They never intended to advance to Merv; but if the people of Merv of their own accord came to them, would it be a wise policy to reject a "voluntary" submission? And thus, slowly, silently, without excessive cracking of her whip, Russian supremacy, in her well-oiled car of progress, has been moving on through all Central Asia.

Russia is the only European power which has an absolute government. Its autocratic feature, so fiercely assailed upon the accession of Nicholas I. by the "Constitutionals," or "Republicans," of 1825, and under Alexander II. by the Nihilist conspiracies, seems to have taken on a new life in the estimation of the Russian people, because, according to the expression of Prince Oukhtomski, it is the necessary condition of the greatness of their nation and of her "supernatural" and provi-

dential mission in Asia. If the foundation of the government remains autocratic, this autocracy, is at least more sincerely an "enlightened despotism" than was the absolutism of the eighteenth century, a despotism thoughtful of the economic interests and the well-being of the people, blending its ambitions with the legitimate aspirations of the nation. It has borrowed from the West municipal or provincial self-government, but not the parliamentary, not even the representative regimen. In Russia there is no minister responsible to legislative bodies, where changeable majorities successively displace one another; but ministers having the confidence of the sovereign continue in office for a long time, in such manner that from 1815 to 1882 Russia had only two ministers of foreign affairs, Nesselrode and Gortchakof, and since the latter date there have been only three, De Giers, Lobanof, and Muravief. How many have been those that have followed one another during these past eighty-five years in France, England, and even the United States! This permanency in office allows continuity of the same political views and constancy in realizing them. No parliament, therefore, no questionings, no blue or yellow books. A restricted liberty of the press closes with respect the indiscreet lips of reporters and interviewers. Hence secrecy in both planning and executing is possible. There is no need of throwing dust in the eyes of parliaments, of the newspapers, and of the people; nor is there any need of

brag, optimistic proclamations, and of oratorical heroics. Great conquests can be accomplished silently.

This form of government, though it may appear as archaic as the despotism of Nebuchadnezzar or of the Grand Turk, does not exclude the use of the most modern appliances and scientific methods over which free peoples pride themselves : railroads, telegraphs, telephones, improved cannon and rifles, battleships and cruisers of the latest pattern, a thorough knowledge of history, of ethnography, and of all forms of human speech, from those of Finland to those of Kamtchatka. It does not exclude the system of military organization in vigorous operation by the powerful and enlightened nations of France and Germany, nor yet the art of securing from the people the maximum of military power.

Russia has a regular army like France and Germany, national militia like Switzerland, and irregular troops like those of the Shah of Persia and the Emperor of China. These irregulars date back to the beginning of Russian expansion. The Czars of Moscow had their Cossacks of the Dnieper, of the Don, of the Volga, and of the Ural. In proportion as conquest succeeded conquest, the soldier class of the subdued peoples were amalgamated with the Russians in the " Cossack armies " of the Terek, of the Kuban, of the Caucasus, and of Turkestan. There are to-day Cossacks of the Trans-Baikal, of the Pamirs, and of the Amur. For hundreds and thousands of kilometres,

they constitute the grand guard of the regular army, the mobile curtain of light cavalry that will screen its movements, "free lances," for whose too audacious encroachment and too bold raids, it will be possible to disavow all responsibility.

Behind these, like another advance guard, come the merchants, adventurers also, *merchant adventurers*, as the English of the fifteenth century said. Behind these, again, sally forth the colonists in search of cheap land, and who, following the course of the rivers and streams, at times venturing into the jungles, found villages over which will soon rise the humble bell-tower of a church. All these people, Cossacks, officers, and soldiers of the regular army, merchants, colonists, and even the *tchinovniks*, or officials, possess to a degree not met with in any other European nation, the gift of adaptation to a new climate and environment, and the gift of assimilating native races or of becoming assimilated with them. The peasant of European Russia, very much mixed, especially in the East, with Finnish or Turkish blood and characteristics, does not differ essentially from the Ostiak and the Vogul of Western Siberia. These, in turn, show no marked difference from the Turkish population of Eastern Siberia, such as the Yakuts. From these to the Mongolian races, such as the Tunguses, the Buriats, and the Manchus, and from these to the Chinese population, there is scarcely any noticeable transition. There was a time when from the Dnieper to the Pacific, all obeyed

the same master, the Grand Khan, "the Son of Heaven," whose heir to-day is the "White Czar." From the Dnieper to the Pacific extends the same plain, are found the same climate and the same soil, barren steppes alternating with fertile mould; the same manner of life, of dwelling, and of dress; the same endurance of extreme cold, excessive heat, privations, fatigue, long journeys, and a half-nomadic existence; and the same tendency to Oriental fatalism, which the orthodox term Christian resignation. And thus, as Elisée Reclus remarks, the Yakuts easily become Russians and the Russians as easily become Yakuts, and both Russians and natives possess the same readiness in acquiring the language of the foreigner.

Does not the difference in religion constitute a barrier between them? The Russian peasant with his rudimentary faith, to which, nevertheless, he holds with all his heart, and even the *pope*, or parish priest, with his vaguely uncertain theology and his ignorance, are free from all intolerance. Any form of the Christian religion, whatever value it may have, although it clashes with the still less highly developed beliefs of the Mohammedan peoples, makes its way among tribes that are pagan, Shamanist, Fetichist, or vaguely Buddhist. Between the Russians and the pagans there is established a oneness of faith or superstition. There is no question of complicated dogmas devised by the subtle brains of Alexandria or of Byzantium. The untutored Siberians do not fall into controversies

over the mystery of the Trinity, the twofold nature of the Redeemer, or transubstantiation. The idea of God is too lofty for these coarse minds, but they all agree in placing on the summit of their Pantheon Saint Nicholas, the Thaumaturgist, and above him, beneath him, or equal with him, Christ and the Virgin. Beneath these come saints, Christian or with a physiognomy that may be pagan, Buddhistic, and at times Mohammedan. And all this multiform worship is in full harmony with the primitive cult of springs and of certain venerable trees, with the belief in demons of the forests and river sprites, and with the custom of wearing certain amulets that the orthodox priest, the Shamanist sorcerer, or the Hadji returned from Mecca, may furnish. What more is necessary in order to be, in this life, successful on the farm, or in fishing, or in hunting, or in war, and, in the next, to be certain of salvation? The Tunguse, the Buriat, the Vogul, and the Ostiak, who firmly believe in Saint Nicholas, have already become, or are in the process of becoming, Russian. Are not the Tchuvashi, the Mordva, and the Meshtcheraks all children of the same father, that is, subjects of the same Czar? Though they may be Mohammedans, do they not still believe in the virtue of certain magical words uttered by the orthodox priest, the efficacy of the holy waters in driving away Cheïtan (Satan) and evil Djinns, in the protection that Saint Blaise, the old-time god, Valoss, of the Russians, extends over their flocks, and in the cures wrought

in the name of Saint Cosme or in that of Saint Damian, those heavenly physicians, who cure their adherents without requiring remuneration?

Those two scourges, journalism and theology, being almost unknown in the Asiatic Empire of the Czar, one can live there in a happy confusion of things. Politics does not create any differences among men, and religion scarcely any. There is no time to reflect and subtilize upon the more or less brown or yellow color of the face, the more or less turned-up shape of the nose, the more or less slant of the eyes, or the more or less prominence of the cheeks. In no degree of the social scale is there known the prejudice "of the skin," so pronounced among the English and Americans, and noticeable, but to much less extent, among the French, Portuguese, and Spanish colonists. Russian colonization is not destructive of aboriginal races; it does not exterminate them, it absorbs them. Marriages, legal or otherwise, are frequent between the conquerors and the conquered. Already, in the days of Ivan the Terrible, Tartar Khans became Russian princes. To her subjects of brown or of saffron complexion, of Buddhist or of Mohammedan religion, Russia has always shown more liberality than France has to her Algerian subjects. In Algeria it has become difficult for an Arab or a Berber to rise above the grade of captain, but majors, colonels, and even generals of Turkish or Circassian race, and even of the Mohammedan religion, are numerous in the Asiatic armies of the "White Czar."

The Russians of Europe are fully able of themselves to people their Asiatic colonies without having to assimilate the natives, and without the assistance of foreign immigration. Russia is fortunate in that her colonies are only a prolongation of her own territories. To become a colonist, there is no ocean to cross, no steamboat fare to pay. The poorest peasant, a staff in his hand, an axe at his belt, his boots slung from a cord over his shoulder, can pass from one halting-place to another, until he reaches the ends of the empire. Moreover, the population of Russia, by its own birth rate, increases, in spite of insufficient medical care at childbirth, with a rapidity unknown to any other nation of European blood, excepting, perhaps, the Canadian French. In 1878–79, the subjects of the Czar numbered ninety-six millions, in 1899 they reached one hundred and twenty-nine millions, an increase in twenty years of thirty-three millions, a number almost equal to the population of the kingdom of Italy, or an annual increase of about one million six hundred thousand souls, a number that about equals the present population of North Carolina or Alabama. With such a treasury of men to draw from, neither military power nor colonial strength will be lacking. In Siberia, before 1895, the increase of population by immigration alone was only about ninety-two thousand per year. Since the suppression of penal transportation, especially since the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad, immigration has brought in two hundred thousand annu-

ally. The population of Siberia must by this time have reached the figure of seven millions. Of this number at least six millions are Russians. This, however, is one person for each square kilometre of territory, so that neither is there any lack of land.

For a long time the Russian sovereign needed two things to enable him to boldly plunge into the depths of Asia. First, he lacked the assurance that England or the German powers would not be able to foment on his European frontiers one of those coalitions like those that resulted in the Crimean War or in the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; secondly, he lacked "the sinews of war," or, as the English phraseology is, "the Cavalry of Saint George." The alliance with France, outlined at Kronstadt in 1891, proclaimed at Paris in 1896, and at St. Petersburg in 1897, has given the Czar the two things that were wanting. It assures the safety of the European frontiers against any effort of the Triple Alliance. In the Far East, in 1895, we have seen how, at the same time, France and Germany took in hand the interests of Russia against Japanese ambition and British hostility. The Germany of Bismarck attempted to ruin Russia's credit in the Berlin exchange and in the European market. France threw open her market and her credit to Russia, and either in France, or thanks to her, the Czar, within a few years, has been able to borrow several milliards. This has enabled him to strengthen his army, put a powerful navy afloat, con-

sent to large loans to China and Persia, complete his European railroad system, and push forward the work upon the Trans-Caucasus, the Trans-Siberian, the Trans-Manchurian, and the Trans-Chinese railroads.

The results of the daring raids through Turkestan, in the direction of the Persian Gulf and of Afghanistan, and towards the Amur and the Japan Sea, are now consolidated by a wholly modern outfit of war and travel. In Turkestan, the ancient capitals of Tamerlane, the fortresses conquered by the heroism of the Pérovskis, the Tchernaïefs and of the Skobelefs, all of which called for so much skill and careful manipulation on the part of Russian diplomacy, are to-day railroad stations. There are dining-room stations at Merv, Bokhara, Samarkand, Kokhand, Andijan, Tashkend, etc., and the Russian station of Kushk is only one hundred and twenty kilometres from Herat. The Trans-Siberian railroad with its numerous stations, its branch lines to Khabarovsk, Port Arthur, and Pekin, and the annexed systems that penetrate the Chinese Empire, has consolidated all that was accomplished by the venturesome explorers of former times, from Irmak or Khabarof to Lieutenant Nevelskoï of our day. The principal line, six thousand two hundred kilometres long, with its bridges of eight hundred metres over the Obi and the Irtysh, of one thousand metres over the Yenisei and the Selenga, with its ferry-boat, one hundred metres long, that ferries the trains across the southern bay of Lake Baikal, permits the transportation of colonists, merchants, regiments, and

brings to bear upon the further side of Asia all the power of the Czar who reigns at St. Petersburg. In 1889, the merchants of Nizhni Novgorod, in an address to the Emperor Alexander III., predicted in these terms the brilliant future of the Trans-Siberian: "It will unite to Europe, through the Russian Empire, four hundred millions of Chinese, and forty-two millions of Japanese. One will be able to go from Europe to Shanghai by Vladivostock in twenty days instead of the thirty-five which the Canadian route requires, or the forty-five of the Suez route." The distance between Europe and the Far East will still be further shortened by the extension of the Russian railroad to Port Arthur. In the commerce of the world, the Trans-Siberian will work as important a revolution as did the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope in the fifteenth century, or the construction of the Suez Canal in the nineteenth. The future policy of Russia will be to secure the full attainment of what she has been striving after for centuries in her onward march through the Siberian wilds, that is, access to seas free from ice, where her fleets of war and commerce may have unhindered course. Russia is attaining this freedom of the sea four hundred years later than Spain, Portugal, France, England, and Holland. She has lost nothing in having waited so long. Thus far, she has passed through the Baltic and the Mediterranean periods, with a power for expansion unknown to her predecessors. She is about to inaugurate a new era in her history; the oceanic, the world-wide era, is merely beginning for the Slav.

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